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HISTORICAL WRITING IN THE HIJAZĪ NAHDA:
THE WRITINGS OF MUHIBB AL-DIN AL-KHATIB AS A VEHICLE FOR THE MODERN

BY

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Chapter One

The *Hijazī Nahda* in the Umbrella of Intellectual History

Introduction

The nineteenth and early twentieth century represented a period of immense change in the Middle East that culminated in the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the beginnings of nationalism, and the adoption of the nation-state model.[1] World War I initiated an eclectic range of responses from societies within and outside of the Ottoman Empire. Colonial regimes in North Africa, India, and the Middle East responded by declaring war on the Ottoman Empire and employed their resources to the task of disrupting and defeating the Sublime Porte. This confronted Muslims throughout the world with a difficult and perplexing question: How were they (especially those Muslims under colonial rule) to decide to whom their allegiance was owed and more importantly what actions should they take during the war? There certainly was no uniform answer nor authority upon which they could consult and their experiences whether in Lebanon, Egypt, Arabia, or Iraq were markedly different, making the decision all the more complicated and the answers even more diverse.[2]

The Islamic world had already provided a wide body of discourse on the topic of modernity and the questions that it raised during the late nineteenth century in the form of the *nahda* (pl. *nahdāt*).[3] This period coincided with the advance of print technologies and the

[1] This process is certainly not uniform nor complete and remains even today a highly contested topic.
[2] Ideological differences, sectarian divides, questions of ethnicity, and the local sources that supported their answers were all drawn into this question and answered to varying degrees.
[3] Two seminal works deal in great detail with this subject, see: George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement.* (J.B. Lippincott Company, 1939); Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1789-1939.* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983 2nd ed.).

growing social awareness that periodicals can create.[4] The intellectualism of the period rejuvenated the Arabs and others to begin re-examining their own history, language, and culture for purposes that were guided by the socio-political concerns of the day. Nowhere did this process become more evident than in the periodical publications emanating from the Beirut-Cairo nexus following the restoration of the Ottoman constitution in 1908 and the rise of the Committee of Union and Progress (C.U.P.). The old censorship laws of Sultan Abdul-Hamid II, already relaxed in Egypt by the British, were temporarily repealed in the Arab provinces in 1908 and print culture expanded.[5]

The language of Arabic also continued a process of adaptation and development within the medium of print as Arab journalist gained more freedom and exposure to Western sources, especially in the areas of philosophy, science, and history.[6] The interaction between foreign and domestic sources meant that political and scientific vocabulary was often expanded or invented to address societal needs as people navigated their way through the political, social, and technological developments of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. This process organically began to reconfigure their own disciplinary approaches to history, religion, philosophy, and science and the function of the Arab press.

The *Hijazī* newspaper *al-Qibla* has received surprisingly little scholarly attention within the discipline of intellectual history even as it remains the main ideological arena for what its

[4] For more on the function of print and its ability to foster a national consciousness, see: Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism.* (New York: Verso. 2006 2nd Ed.).
[5] This was one of the factors which facilitated the growing discontent that was developing amongst Arabs and Turks as Arabs increasingly felt that they were being excluded from the political process. For information of censorship laws, see: Donald J. Cioeta, "Ottoman Censorship in Lebanon and Syria, 1876-1908." *International Journal of Middle East Studies,* Vol. 10 (1979): 167-186. For information on the expansion of print, see: Ami Ayalon. *The Press in the Arab Middle East*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
[6]Marwa Elshakry. *Reading Darwin in Arabic, 1860-1950.* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013).

editors termed the *Hijazī nahda*.[7] The editorials contained in *al-Qibla* reflect the transitional nature of language and print as Arab editors grappled with the effects of World War I and their place within the modern world. To confront this problem and disembark from the path of previous scholarship I will begin to unpack the conception of the Arab revolt and the nature of legitimacy by focusing on the *Hijazī nahda* as an analytical category. The *Hijazī nahda* as a typology was a crucial institution within the Arab press for defining and renegotiating notions of history, culture, and religion by altering how perceptions of time and space were understood within their readership. The opaqueness of the term *nahda* and the broad intellectualism which it claimed to represent has caused recent scholarship to de-categorize the *nahda* as the "history of ideas" in favor of a "conceptual history" which seeks to understand the development of its typology, who the actors were, when and where it developed, and how it came to be popularized.[8] Simply put, "conceptual history" has shifted the focus of scholars towards the local discursive traditions and their influence on the historiography of the *nahda*.

The *nahda* was not a homogenous intellectual movement that could claim uniformity in the various Arab provinces as it was transported across the Islamic world to Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and Arabia as well as Europe. The *nahda* began in the late nineteenth century in conjunction with the Beirut-Cairo nexus which remained the intellectual and literary pipeline that transported print materials and intellectuals (*nahdawīn*) from Syria to Egypt. These *nahdawīn* in turn

[7]For the sole example, see: William L. Cleveland, "The Role of Islam as Political Ideology in the First World War," ed. Edward Ingram in *National and International Politics in the Middle East.* (New Jersey, Frank Cass & Co. ltd., 1986), 84-101. The editors of *al-Qibla* coined the term *Hijazī nahda* early with it first appearing in Issue 2, see: Fu'ad al-Khatib, "mauqif al-'arab ba'da nahda al-ḥijāz," *al-Qibla*, Issue 2, (Shawwal 18, 1334).
[8] Henri Lauziere, "The Construction of the Salafiyya: Reconsidering Salafism from the Perspective of Conceptual History." *International Journal of Middle East Studies,* Vol. 42 (2010): 369-389.

traveled extensively in and outside of the Islamic world establishing networks and nodal points in the periphery and defining for a developing print-culture what it meant to be modern.

This thesis takes the *Hijazī nahda* as its focus and analyzes the physical and intellectual processes in which it was underwritten and developed. The various *nahda* movements and the *nahdawīn* who formed them existed within their local societies and brought with themselves their own experiences and trainings, many in the Arab press. The *Hijazī nahda* (1908-1924) stands apart from its regional neighbors in one critical regard: it was a future oriented state-building project that sought to locate itself in the international order. This distinguished the *Hijazī nahda* from the Egyptian and Yemeni *nahdāt* and altered how the editors of *al-Qibla* engaged with the topic of modernity. The Yemeni *nahda* (1890-1950) for example was legal in character and accompanied by a religious focus that emphasized the development of education along pedagogical traditions specific to the sectarian make-up of Yemen.[9] The Egyptian *nahda* in turn was more oriented towards the removal of the colonial British and the revival of the historical legacy of Mehmet Ali who served at the center of a historical process characterized by one scholar as the "Founder Paradigm/Thesis."[10] The *Hijazī nahda* shared with its regional neighbors a similar methodological approach to historical writing as we will see but the forum, objectives, and sometimes mediums remained very different. A brief historical overview of the *nahda* discipline contained in the next section is in order before we begin our examination of the

[9] Brinkley Messick. *The Calligraphic State: Textual Domination and History in a Muslim Society*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).

[10] The "Founder Paradigm/Thesis" argues that there existed within Egypt a historical tradition centered on the Egyptian ruler Mehmet Ali in which he and the Egyptian state he created stood at the center of modern Egyptian historiography and influenced the ways in which Egyptian scholars and literati wrote and conceptualized their place in the international order. See, Yoav Di-Capua. *Gatekeepers of the Arab Past: Historians and History Writing in Twentieth-Century Egypt.* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009).

Hijazī nahda. This section will lay out my methodological approach and its applicability to the *nahda* discipline and the larger intellectual approaches to historical writing.

Nahda Studies and Inter-Disciplinary Approaches

Nahda studies first began to address the concept of renewal (*nahda*) in the interwar period when George Antonius and later Albert Hourani articulated the contours of the movement by focusing respectively on its political and intellectual agents.[11] These scholars established a structure that guided the discipline throughout the century by emphasizing the role of important actors in reproducing and formulating cultural symbolic systems within the medium of print. The textualist tradition developed by Hourani had a particular methodological system that detached the actors from their local communities and inoculated their writings with a degree of authority that allowed certain groups of actors to become representations of a subset of intellectualism within the larger *nahda* discipline. This process allowed scholars to categorize networks like the network of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh, and Rashid Rida as generalized representations of a particular category.[12] While useful in categorizing particular strands of intellectual thought and then classifying methodological differences within those subsets, the Houranian model expanded the parameters of the *nahda* to include at times contradictory intellectual movements like Islamic modernism and Salafism.

Stephen Sheehi has rightly argued that the Houranian model tends to elevate the position of, "…the authors, intellectuals, literati, and thinkers…" as consummate to, "…originators, genius, and visionaries."[13] Sheehi developed a new model that moved away from the

[11] Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*; Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age*.
[12] This is why scholars can speak relatively comfortably about such sub-disciplines as Islamic modernism, Salafism, Pan-Arabism, Islamism, etc.
[13] Stephen Sheehi, "Towards a Critical Theory of *al-Nahdah*: Epistemology, Ideology, and Capital." *Journal of Arabic Literature,* Vol. 43 (2012): 269-298. pp. 273.

categorization of the Houranian model by incorporating local dynamics into the *nahdawī* narrative and favoring the socio-economic narrative. The Sheehi model viewed the "author as producers" of an epistemology formulated within specific local contexts and reflective of societal transition as opposed to discursive formation. The model is quite useful when thinking about the concept of the *Hijazī nahda* whose formation occurred in a period of drastic transformation as colonial regimes continued to establish inroads into the hinterland of the Middle East.

The *Hijazī nahda* as the name suggests was conceptualized from the beginning by the editors of *al-Qibla* as a movement whose historicity is interlinked with the local aspirations of the Hijaz and only later, near the conclusion of the war, did it claim to speak for the other Arab provinces. The *Hijazī nahda* defined an intellectual typology for the process by which the Arab revolt and the notion of an Arab state was underwritten and legitimated in the Arab press. These two events characterized the nature of the *Hijazī nahda* and remained inseparable from its intellectual underpinnings. The Sheehi model alerted scholars to the specific actors of the *Hijazī nahda* and how the local base interacted with the topic of modernity by emphasizing the socio-economic narrative within the production of the *nahda*. Sheehi is concerned with how class structure is formulated at the local level and how the "authors as producers" recapitulate the structure of power within their writings. The discursive outputs of the authors are simply reflections of the intellectual currents present within their societies and their importance lays in the fact that they are manifestations of the relationship, "…between shifts in material culture and social practice."[14]

[14] Sheehi, "Critical Theory of *al-nahdah*," pp. 271.

The Sheehi model moved us past the *madhabic* nature of the Houranian model by emphasizing the local epistemological formations but does not address the process by which the parameters of modernity were established. The Sheehi model acknowledges and highlights the mitigating role of the "author as producers" by showing that *nahdawīn* were the primary actors who addressed the topic of modernity by making intelligible its key characteristics but fails to articulate how this process functioned within the medium of print. To move past the limitations of the Sheehi model, I will outline a middle path that incorporates the "author as producer" component in conjunction with a disciplinary approach that reorients our thought to the processes in which conceptions of modernity are translated and renegotiated within the medium of print. To better understand the connections that lie between the late nineteenth century *nahda* and the *Hijazī nahda*, we will focus in particular on the writings of the chief editor of *al-Qibla*, Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib (1887-1969). Muhibb al-Din remained a writer and literati throughout his life in Syria, Egypt, and the Hijaz and an active agent in the Arab press who repeatedly engaged with the topic of modernity.[15]

The Hijazī Nahda and Historical Writing

The *Hijazī nahda* was predicated on the belief that there existed a relationship between the aspirations of the Arab state/Arab revolt and the late nineteenth century *nahda* in which the former came to symbolize the pinnacle of Arab progress. The editors of *al-Qibla* took the late nineteenth century *nahda* as an elaborating symbol that "…provid[ed] vehicles for sorting out complex and undifferentiated feelings and ideas, making them comprehensible to oneself, communicable to others, and translatable into orderly action."[16] Anthropologist Sherry Ortner

[15] For more on Muhibb al-Din see chapter three below.
[16] Sherry B. Ortner, "On Key Symbols," *American Anthropologist,* Vol. 75. (1973): 1338-1346. pp. 1340.

goes on to write that, "…their key status is indicated primarily by their recurrence in cultural behavior or cultural symbolic systems."[17] In the first sixty issues of *al-Qibla,* there are six different articles that deal with the *Hijazī nahda* in particular, ten that deal with the topic of the Arab renaissance, and thirteen that deal with questions of history, religion, language, and culture in relation to the Arab Revolt.[18] The frequency in which these terms appear and the relationship that is established between the categories of history, culture, and religion support the argument that the *nahda* did indeed serve as an elaborating symbol within *al-Qibla*.

The creation of the *Hijazī nahda* in the editorials of *al-Qibla* coincided with the development of a methodological system of discourse amongst its editors for framing and conceptualizing the Arab revolt. Muhibb al-Din and other editors historicized their arguments by elevating the primacy of history within their editorials and in the process redefined what it meant to be modern. For the editors of *al-Qibla* for example there had always existed a distinct Arab nation possessing, "…its own history and civilization, book (the Qur'an), and arts…"[19] Historical writing was a mechanism for rewriting how society conceptualized the *Hijazī nahda* and reconfigured how the discipline of history was understood within the readership of *al-Qibla*.

Muhibb al-Din first characterized the *Hijazī nahda* in the pages of *al-Qibla* as an event that awakened society from a deep slumber and "…called to us [the Arabs] from the innermost depths of our hearts, go to work."[20] This was an internal process replicated throughout Arab society because the "…voice of this blessed renaissance (*nahda*)…" existed in all places. Already the model was re-adjusting how perceptions of time and space were understood by

[17] Ortner, "On Key Symbols," pp. 1340.
[18] See: Appendix A.
[19] N.A. "al-nahda al-'arabiyya: da'wa al-āmīr halla hīya 'unṣurīyya ām lā," *al-Qibla*, Issue 2, (Shawwal 17, 1334).
[20] Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib, "kaifa nak̲dama baladnā," *al-Qibla*, Issue 53 (rabi'a al-thāni 22, 1335).

interlocking a disparate readership together through the medium of print. The readership of *al-Qibla* was imbued with a sense of connectivity that eluded pre-modern societies by making it possible to envision an imagined link.[21]

Benedict Anderson developed the idea that print-capitalism, the dual process of economic integration into a capitalist system and the expansion of print technology, helped facilitate the "imagining" process which remained so crucial to the development of a nationalist society. Print-capitalism altered how perceptions of time and space, what Anderson terms "homogenous-empty time," were understood by imbuing modern understandings of time with a degree of simultaneity and trans-locality.[22] The editorials of *al-Qibla* are replete with examples of this process showcasing how the distances of time and space were gradually shortened through print-capitalism. This reorientation of time imbued the discipline of history with a disproportionate amount of influence over society and made it possible for the readership of *al-Qibla* to re-conceptualize other markers of identity. Yoav Di-Capua wrote that:

> "…it became impossible to conceive of and execute modernity without historical thought. Regardless of the forum in which one chose to operate -political, economic, social, [religious], or other- if it aspired to be modern, it must be based on history."[23]

As history became a prerequisite for the modern it transformed the nature of religion, whose entrenchment in the Hijaz was both political and cultural, into a sub-set of the historical process. Religion like history in service to the *Hijazī nahda* was discursive and imbued with the same understandings of "homogenous empty-time" allowing it to make claims upon the future, in

[21] Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, pp. 5-7.
[22] Anderson, *Imagined Communities,* pp. 22-36.
[23] Yoav Di-Capua, *Gatekeepers of the Arab Past*, pp. 4.

essence defining the modern. Religion was no longer a separate category outside of the realm of history but subservient to the project of modernity displaying itself as "…a group of social virtues and methods of learning…the rights upon which the Arabs were entrusted…"[24] The place of religion in the Hijaz was a visible public manifestation for "…the *Qibla* of the Muslims is [located] behind these plains and mountains [The Hijaz]…" and because "…embracing the *Qibla* of Mecca is also to embrace the *umma* and the greatness that [she represents]."[25] The place of the *umma* was as relevant in the present and future order as it was during the time of the *salaf* because time, which is objectified by history, has made it possible to reimagine the place of religion within the world and the importance of the Hijaz.

The transformative process was long and required that the Hijaz be incorporated into the larger capitalist system as well as developing the necessary technological advancements to facilitate the spreading of print-capitalism. The time frame in which this occurred in the Islamic world began during the late nineteenth century and continued unabated until and even after the end of World War I. Chapter two will locate the position of the Hijaz geographically, economically, and technologically by exploring the development of the Red Sea economy and the expansion of print technologies through the Beirut-Cairo nexus. The *Hijazī nahda* represented a transitional moment in the Islamic world when the economic, political, and technological advancements of the late nineteenth century reached fruition in the peripheries and bridged the divide between the past, present, and the future. The object is to show that the Hijaz was not "…relatively stagnant from the point of view of its social, political, and economic

[24] Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib, "al-islām wa al-jāma'at al-'arabiyya," *al-Qibla*, Issue 52, (rabi'a al-thāni, 19, 1335).
[25] Al-Khatib, *al-Qibla*, Issue 52, (rabi'a al-thāni, 19, 1335).

processes…" but instead stood at the center of an emerging order that was increasingly globalized and capitalist.[26]

The focus of chapter three will be the actors and agents themselves who shaped the nature of the *Hijazī nahda* and in the process defined what it meant to be modern. The lives of Muhibb al-Din and the *Berutī* editor Fu'ad al-Khatib (1879-1957) will be outlined and utilized as representations of the educational and political development of *nahdawīn* active within the Beirut-Cairo nexus. There are broad common denominators present in the experiences of Syrian, Egyptian, and Yemeni *nahdawīn* as well as differences. The purpose of this chapter is to distinguish how the actors themselves tailored their resources to address local society and how each local *nahda* repositioned the place of texts and by extension the roles of education and knowledge.

Chapter four will address microcosmically the place of historical writing in the *Hijazī nahda* and how that effected notions of time and space by making it possible to envision a larger *Hijazī* community. Historical writing in the Hijaz differed from its Egyptian and Yemeni counterparts in significant ways by reorienting the objectives of the *Hijazī nahda* towards the future and focusing upon a state building project that was either relegated or non-existent in other *nahdāt*. Explaining how that process influenced the nature of language and understandings of modernity will illuminate in one way how notions of statehood, patriotism, and natural rights entered the discourse of the *Hijazī nahda*.

[26] Hasan Kayali, *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918.* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997) pp. 144. For more on the developing global order and its relationship with technological advancement see: James L. Gelvin and Nile Green, ed., *Global Muslims in the Age of Steam and Print.* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014).

Chapter five will continue our previous investigation of historical writing by reorienting our attention upon the discipline of religion. The place of religion in *Hijazī* society underwent a transformation in the editorials of *al-Qibla* and influenced how *Hijazī nahdawīn* conceptualized the nature of legitimacy and authority. Employing a comparative case study model, I will examine the position of law in the *Hijazī nahda* and explain how the position of religion as a discipline became subsumed under history. Islamic ideologies were peripheral to the main objectives of the *Hijazī nahda* and the position of religion served a distinct purpose for *Hijazī nahdawīn*. Identifying and defining that purpose will explain the nature of authority, reflect the centrality of history to the objectives of the *Hijazī nahda*, and distinguish the *Hijazī nahda* from other *nahdāt*. Chapter six will serve as the conclusion.

Chapter Two

Capitalist Imaginings and Print Publications

Introduction

The socio-economic environment in "conceptual history" is of prime importance to the local discursive contours of intellectual movements. The geographical proximity of the Egyptian state and British domination of the Red Sea and Indian Ocean networks coupled with the administrative presence of the Ottoman Empire influenced how the Hijaz perceived itself within the international order. This chapter, employing the Sheehi model, will contextualize the relationship that existed between the Hijaz and the Egyptian state economically and the development of print technology macrocosmically as a backdrop for explaining the production of *al-Qibla* and local agents active within the *Hijazī nahda*. The incorporation of the Hijaz into the capitalist system and the development of a print culture was a relatively late phenomenon that developed independently of state actors and was based upon the Hijaz's geographical location.[27] This allowed the *Hijazī nahda* to integrate into the international order quicker that its regional neighbors and also influenced its orientation.

The Hijaz, Egypt, and the Red Sea Economy

The Hijaz in the nineteenth century had become increasingly connected to the Red Sea trade network which was dominated by the Egyptian state and colonial Britain.[28] In the early-

[27] For an outline of the historical development of the Hijaz, see: Eldon Rutter, "The Hejaz," *The Geographical Journal*, Vol. 2 (1931): 97-108.

[28] The British presence certainly increased following the opening of the Suez Canal. For a general discussion, see: Max. E. Fletcher, "The Suez Canal and World Shipping, 1869-1914," *The Journal of Economic History,* Vol. 18 (1958): 556-573; for a discussion of Egypt's role in the Red Sea trade networks see: Andre' Raymond, "A Divided Sea: The Cairo Coffee Trade in the Red Sea Area during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," In *Modernity and Culture: From the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean,* ed. Leila Tarazi Fawaz and C.A. Bayly, (New York: Colombia University Press, 2002): 46-57.

nineteenth century Mecca and Medina were occupied by the *Wahhabis* of Najd for a brief period before being displaced by the Egyptian army of Mehmet Ali.[29] The Hijaz then nominally remained an Ottoman possession throughout the nineteenth century housing an Ottoman *Vali*, garrison, post office, and other Ottoman bureaucratic features. The earlier Egyptian occupation however had reoriented its economy and by extension its social and cultural exchanges lay within the Egyptian matrix.[30] The establishment of the British condominium over Egypt and the Sudan only exacerbated these socio-economic circumstances as the Red Sea trade and the Indian Ocean networks were increasingly dominated by the British colonial enterprise.

With the advancements made in steam technology and the increasing role of steamships in trading networks, Jidda became a fuel depot for steamships traveling from Europe and Egypt to India and the Persian Gulf.[31] Colette Dubois writes that:

> "Jiddah was connected to Egypt by a network of Arab and Egyptian merchants and to Aden and Bombay by a network of Indians and Europeans. Jiddah became a center of international trade: …steamships on their regular run would deposit cargo there before continuing on."[32]

Those networks of merchants from Egypt, Bombay, Calcutta, and Java remained a feature of the Hijaz well into the twentieth century. A cursory culling of announcements (*i'lān*)

[29] For more information on this period, see: Mohammad Ameen, *A Study of Egyptian Rule in Eastern Arabia (1818-1841).* (PhD diss., McGill University, 1981); Madawi al-Rasheed, *A History of Saudi Arabia.* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010 2nd ed.), pp. 13-35.
[30] The economy of the Hijaz was entirely dependent on the Hajj, subsidies from the Ottoman government, and foodstuffs from Egypt. This made the Hijaz particularly vulnerable to outside pressure and political influence, see: William L. Ochsenwald, "The Jidda Massacre of 1858," *Middle Eastern Studies,* Vol. 13 (1977): 314-326. pp. 314.
[31] Colette Dubois, "The Red Sea Ports during the Revolution in Transportation, 1800-1914," In *Modernity and Culture: From the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean,* ed. Leila Tarazi Fawaz and C.A. Bayly, (New York: Colombia University Press, 2002): 58-74.
[32] Dubois, "The Red Sea Ports," pp. 61.

from *al-Qibla* from 1916-1919 reveals the extent of their participation in the economic activity of the Hijaz.[33] The announcements include for example, the firing of al-Hajj Hussein Ali Reza who ran a trading store in Jidda that was part of a larger chain of trade stores headquartered in Bombay and Calcutta; the death of a prominent Javanese watchmaker who was appointed timekeeper at the prophet's mosque in Medina; and an announcement detailing an event being held at the Egyptian hospice house for residents of the Hijaz.[34] These announcements are beside advertisements showcasing the Egyptian cultural magazine, *al-Lutha'if al-Masura* and the *Beirutī* newspaper *al-Haqiqa* at a cost of two Egyptian pounds per subscription.[35] That both the Egyptian journal and the *Beirutī* newspaper are advertised at prices using currency that was in heavy circulation in Egypt attests to its influence in the *Hijazī* economy.[36]

The society of the Hijaz, as the announcements demonstrate, was a multi-ethnic conglomerate of Muslims stationed in Jidda, Mecca, and Medina who were heavily involved in the Red Sea trade network which was dominated by the Egyptian state. This had a significant influence on the local contours of the *Hijazī nahda* because the diasporic communities brought with themselves their own cultural nuances and understandings. *Nahdawīn* throughout the Islamic world had to account for the local constituency in their provinces when framing their own individual *nahdāt*. Fruma Zachs has shown that "The *Beirutī* merchants did not merely sponsor cultural activities; [but] some of them played active roles as cultural catalyst, another

[33] The announcements section of *al-Qibla* was neither regular nor uniform containing a variety of local news alongside advertisements for literary magazines published in Egypt and Beirut. The subject material and infrequency in which they were published leads the author to believe that they were only published at the request of local businessmen or citizens.
[34] N.A. "i'lān," *al-Qibla,* Issue 63, (jumādā al-`awalā, 28, 1335); N.A. "i'lān," *al-Qibla,* Issue 401, (dhu al-q'ada, 3, 1338); N.A. "i'lān," *al-Qibla*, Issue 137, (Safar, 28, 1336).
[35] N.A. "i'lān," *al-Qibla,* Issue 11, (dhu al-q'ada, 21, 1334); N.A. "i'lān," *al-Qibla,* Issue 401, (dhu al-q'ada, 3, 1338).
[36] The Egyptian journal cost around 15 Francs for a yearly subscription and the *Beirutī* newspaper cost two Egyptian pounds.

important contribution to the *nahda*."[37] The *Hijazī* merchants like their *Beirutī* counterparts were also active agents in the formation of the *Hijazī nahda*.

The local fabric of the Hijaz included Javanese, Arab, and Indian merchants, dictating that the *Hiajzī nahda* conform to a multi-ethnic society that shared a similar religious affiliation in a broad generic sense (Islam). This meant that the message of the *Hijazī nahda* was often constructed to resemble the populism of Islamic modernism, which "…sought to reconcile Islamic faith and modern values such as constitutionalism, as well as cultural revival, nationalism, freedom of religious interpretation, scientific investigation, modern-style education, [and] women's rights…"[38] Muhibb al-Din wrote that, "Certainly the Turks exhausted the Arab community with all forms of hostility in order to create divisions between the various Arab countries by pointing out their doctrinal differences. However, the Arabs reassured each other in their meetings that they were committed to the removal of the Turks and the obtainment of liberation…"[39] The notion of sectarianism is relegated at the expense of future liberation that resembled progress, universal rights, and collective action, those shared principles of Islamic modernism.

Historian Seema Alavi has argued that the Hijaz should be viewed by historians as an area of intersection between the Colonial and Ottoman Empires where resourceful individuals could manipulate the power structures of the international arena in their favor.[40] Alavi has traced out the lives of two Indian nationals who immigrated to the Hijaz in the late nineteenth century

[37] Fruma Zachs, "Cultural and Conceptual Contributions of Beiruti Merchants to the *Nahda*,"*Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient,* Vol. 55 (2012): 153-182. pp. 179.
[38] Charles Kurzman ed., *Modernist Islam, 1840-1940: A Sourcebook*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 4.
[39] Al-Khatib, *al-Qibla*, Issue 52, (rabi'a al-thāni, 19, 1335).
[40] Seema Alavi, 'Fugitive Mullahs and Outlawed Fanatics:' Indian Muslims in Nineteenth Century Trans-Asiatic Imperial Rivalries." *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 45 (2011): 1337-1382.

and successfully manipulated the "imperial fault-lines" by utilizing print publications and embedding themselves within the local power structures. Indian and Javanese immigrants were active members in shaping the character of the *Hijazī nahda* by establishing schools, teaching local *Hijazīs*, and promoting Islamic universalism. One of these individuals, Maulana Kairanwi, became a member of the Meccan '*ulama* at *al-haram al-sharif*, secured a paid salary, established a *madrasa*, and wrote several works on Islamic learning. Alavi wrote that:

> "His [Kairanwi's] *madrasa* at Mecca was sustained by his effective handling of imperial fault-lines both within the [Ottoman] empire and outside it. Its core nurtured older forms of Islamic connectivity, exemplifying the making of a social body based on the principles of unity, progress, and civilization, all embedded in the divine scriptures, but also reaching out to referents in scientific and technical education, rationality, emulation, and Sufi *tassawuf*."[41]

Kairanwi was so incensed by the educational situation in the Hijaz that upon his appointment to the *al-haram* mosque he established a *madrasa* which sought to be "…a truly international school that [could] boast of a syllabus that covered both religious (*dini*) and worldly (*dunyavi*) education."[42] Alavi also wrote that:

> "He had many…Javanese students who were similarly trained. Indeed many of Kairanwi's students like Shaikh Abdullah Siraj and Sheikh Ahmed Ali Hassan became *muftis* and *qadis* and teachers in the *haram sharif* and other mosques and madrasas in Mecca, Taif, and the madrasas of Hindustan and Karachi."[43]

[41] Alavi, "Fugitive Mullahs," pp. 1367.
[42] Alavi, "Fugitive Mullahs," pp. 1368.
[43] Alavi, "Fugitive Mullahs," pp. 1373-1374.

Kairanwi is reflective of reform-minded Indian *nahdawīn* who utilized their diasporic networks, financial relationships, and print publications to influence the contours of their localities. Education was of primary concern to *nahdawīn* in the pre/post-war period and the Hijaz maintained a very traditional form of education up until the Arab revolt. The *Hijazī* educational system was similar to Yemen were education primarily occurred in local *madrasas* and *khuttabs*, typically led be religious sheikhs and primarily focused on Qur'an recitation, memorization of hadith and *sunna*, and the development of Arabic grammar.[44]

Sharif Hussein began a massive reform of the educational system in 1913 that structured Islamic learning within the Hijaz by creating a uniform syllabus which included such subjects as Islamic Law, Arabic grammar, syntax, morphology, rhetoric, and elocution.[45] By 1917, Sharif Hussein had effectively established a ministry of education, reformed the syllabus to include science, arithmetic, geography, and history, and founded the Agricultural and Military colleges.[46] Although Sharif Hussein primarily appointed Syrians to lead his educational reform efforts, the framework and also its members were most likely drawn from the pool of Javanese and Indian intellectuals stationed in the Hijaz.[47] These Indian and Javanese *nahdawīn* shared a common intellectual legacy with individuals like Maulana Kairanwi and its through this process that we can see how the local discourses are influenced and constructed.

[44] Abdul-latif Abdullah Dohaish in a comprehensive study of the *Hijazī* educational system notes that there were around 50 *khuttabs* in Mecca, Medina, and Jidda by 1916 and that none offered their students a degree (J'iziyya) upon completion, see: Abdul-latif Abdullah Dohaish, *History of the Education of the Hijaz up until 1925: Comparative and Critical Study,* (Cairo: Dar al-Fikr al-'Arabī, 1978).
[45] Dohaish, *History of the Education of the Hijaz*, pp. 190-192.
[46] Dohaish, *History of the Education of the Hijaz,* pp. 190-192. The author cities *al-Qibla*, Issue 62, (Juma' al-Awwal, 25, 1335); *al-Qibla*, Issue 35, (Safar, 18, 1335) as his sources.
[47] The undersecretary, Sheikh Ali al-Maliki, and the assistant deputy minister, Sheikh Kamil Ahmad al-Qassab, were both Syrians as were some of the teachers, see: Dohaish, *History of the Education of the Hijaz*, pp. 190-192.

The *Hijazī nahda* developed a connection with Islamic modernism by tailoring its message to the local *Hijazī* community which, leveraging their diasporic networks, began to propagate these similarities throughout the Islamic world. Indian, Javanese, and Arab merchants became active members within their local society and influenced the development of education, trade, and government policy. Scholars often lose sight of this nuanced relationship when analyzing the "history of ideas" because it favors a generalized sweep of the broad intellectual currents at the expense of local context.[48] The local conditions in "conceptual history" as we see exert a significant influence on how the objectives of the *Hijazī nahda* are interpreted just as they draw connections to other intellectual trends which become part of the local historical discourse.

Unlike the violent reactions of Muslims in Aleppo in 1850 which witnessed the massacre of Christians due to Syria's incorporation into the capitalist system and the displacement of the traditional *'ulama* class (*a'yan*), the Hijaz was religiously homogenous and ethnically diverse and its incorporation into the capitalist system was defined by the downplaying of sectarian divides.[49] One reason for this is that the religious homogeneity of the Hijaz coupled with their gradual incorporation of its merchants into the Red Sea economy, meant that its religious identity was never perceived to be threatened and its power base remained stabled up until the Arab revolt. The *Hijazī nahda* then could in some ways exclude discussing the religious issues raised by modernity that the Syrian or *Beirutī nahdāt* either addressed at the risk of division or suppressed in favor of a broad cultural focus.[50] Furthermore, The Hijaz was never directly

[48] Lauziere, "The Construction of the Salafiyya," pp. 371-373.
[49] Bruce Masters, "The 1850 events in Aleppo: An Aftershock of Syria's Incorporation into the World Capitalist System," *International Journal of Middle East Studies,* Vol. 22 (1990): 3-20. One European scholar writing in 1915 estimated the population of Damascus at around 300,000 Muslims, 10,000 Jews, and 20,000 Christians, see: Margaret L. Johnston, "Damascus as a Moslem Centre," *The Muslim World,* Vol. 5, (1915): 151-155.
[50] Fruma Zachs, "Toward a Proto-nationalist Concept of Syria? Revisiting the American Presbyterian Missionaries in the Nineteenth-Century Levant," *Die Welt Des Islams*, Vol. 41, (2001): 145-173.

colonized like its Egyptian, Omani, and Yemeni neighbors and its socio-economic links which developed organically through merchant networks were not perceived as being part of a larger colonial program. In Oman for instance "…British political ascendency and economic supremacy in the Indian Ocean came at the expense of gradual Omani political and economic decline."[51] This is a complete reversal of the Hijaz's incorporation into the Red Sea economy and denotes the difference of perception in how *Hijazī nahdawīn* framed their own revival process. This afforded the *Hijazī nahda* the naivety needed to envision a future order modeled along the nation-state system that was not tainted by the often brutal policies of colonial regimes in Egypt, Yemen, Oman, and elsewhere.

The interior of Arabia in the central Najd plateau where ʻAbd al-ʻAziz b. Saud had recaptured the old *Wahhabi* capitol of Dirʻiyya (Riyadh) in 1902 provides a good example of the cultural contrast between the cosmopolitan Hijaz and its closest regional neighbor. The interior of Arabia was fractured along tribal lines and predominantly occupied by migratory Bedouin with scattered settlements near oasis. The *Najdīs* followed the teachings of Muhammad Ibn ʻAbd al-Wahhab whose political alliance with Muhammad Ibn Saud in 1744 ignited a religious revivalist program that culminated in three successive states.[52] Natana J. DeLong-Bas wrote that:

> "Najd has often been described as a desert wasteland, standing in marked contrast to the more cosmopolitan Hijaz region, which houses the Muslim holy cities of Mecca and Medina. While the Hijaz has been at the forefront of international commerce and

[51]Amal N. Ghazal. *Islamic Reform and Arab Nationalism: Expanding the Crescent from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean (1880s-1930s).* (New York: Routledge, 2010): pp. 22.
[52] David Commins. *The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia.* (New York: I.B. Tauris & Co., 2009); Al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia, pp. 37-41; for more on the Rashidi tribe in Arabia, see: Michael John Baran, "*The Rashidi Amirate of Hayl: The Rise, Development, and Decline of a Pre-Modern Arabian Principality.*" (PhD. Diss., University of Michigan, 1992).

> educational exchanges, Najd has traditionally been considered a more isolated region…"[53]

The isolationism of the interior, the lack of settlements, and the maintaining of tribal identity distinguished the hinterland of Arabia from the coast ethnically, religiously, and culturally. We will revisit the *Najdī-Hijazī* narrative in more detail in chapter six but it should suffice to say that a growing cosmopolitanism in the Hijaz was in direct contradistinction to the prevailing traditionalism of the interior. Before preceding we need to determine how the other half of the print-capitalism paradigm developed within the Hijaz and the relationship that existed between Syria and Egypt in the development of print technologies.

Print Enterprises and the Beirut-Cairo Nexus

The late nineteenth century *nahda* began in conjunction with the development of print technologies, private publication, and educational reform which sought to inform the modern citizen. Printing prior to the *nahda* in the late Ottoman period was primarily a government enterprise, as was the case in Mehmet Ali's Egypt, where the government subsidized the production of printed materials and awarded contracts to individuals acting within an official capacity to travel to Europe.[54] The selection of materials for translation was dictated by the state enterprise and comprised the most useful advancements in administration, military science, natural science, and history.[55] The Syrian experience was markedly different from the Egyptian endeavor because the expansion of print technology was largely carried out independent of the

[53] Natana J. DeLong-Bas, *Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004): pp. 1.
[54]Uthman Nur al-Din was the first official to be dispatched to Europe in 1809 with the expressed purpose of acquiring European works for translation and use in the administration of Mehmet Ali. Ayalon. *The Press in the Arab Middle East*, pp. 13.
[55] Ayalon. *The Press in the Arab Middle East*. pp. 1-50.

local Ottoman authorities by missionaries operating within the empire. Protestant missionaries from America and England were in open competition with the Maronite, Jesuit, and Greek Orthodox communities who operated within the Levant as well as Muslim and Jewish communities living in *bilad al-sham*.[56]

The competition in Syria was most heated in the areas of education and technology as missionaries in a bid to gain converts established seminaries, preparatory schools, and universities to educate Syrian children in the latest scientific advancements.[57] As one missionary wryly noted, "…if Protestant Christianity is to maintain a foothold here [in Beirut], it must do its part in the great work of education."[58] The Syrian Protestant College was to become a crucial institution in the Arab *nahda* not only in terms of translating, producing, and publishing the material which would characterized the "renaissance" but also in training and educating young Syrians in printing techniques, medicine, history, and science. Many of the missionaries and local aids who labored at the printing-press translating the bible into Arabic would go on to become prominent faculty members at the Syrian Protestant College, active members in the Arab *nahda*, and prolific journalist and writers in the Islamic World.[59]

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[56] For a brief first-hand account of the competition and violence that occurred in Beirut see: N.A., "Syria Mission," *The Missionary Herald,* Vol. 61 (1865): 103; N.A., "Missions of the Board," *The Missionary Herald,* Vol. 61 (1865): 311; N.A, "Missions of the Board," *The Missionary Herald,* Vol. 62 *(*1866): 56; These reports detail the beating of a protestant missionary by a Maronite mob, the stoning of a helper in Bano which is north of Tripoli, and the expansion of Jesuit influence within Beirut. For a general outline see: Ussama, Makdisi, "Reclaiming the Land of the Bible: Missionaries, Secularism, and Evangelical Modernity," *The American Historical Review,* Vol. 102 (1997): 680-713. pp. 684-692; A.L. Tibawi, "The Genesis and Early History of the Syrian Protestant College." *Middle East Journal,* Vol. 21 (1967): 1-15. pp. 9-10; Jeremy Salt, "Trouble Wherever they went: American Missionaries in Anatolia and Ottoman Syria in the Nineteenth Century," *The Muslim World,* Vol. 92 (2002): 287-313. pp. 292-293.

[57] An account published in the *Missionary Herald* notes that Protestants also, "…set up a steam flour-mill at Acre... [And] a steam saw-mill…west of Antioch…" as technology became a commodity to attract converts. N.A., "Syria Mission," *The Missionary Herald,* Vol. 65 (1869): 391.

[58] Printed in: ElShakry. *Reading Darwin in Arabic,* pp. 50. ElShakry cities: "Reasons for the establishment of a Syrian Protestant College," ABCFM Papers, Vol. 545: 1860-71, no. 110. as her source.

[59] Daniel Bliss, Henry Jessups, Eli Smith, and Cornelius Van Dyke were all prominent faculty members and founders of the Syrian Protestant College, providing an environment where Arab intellectuals like Faris Nimr,

Private printing became the cornerstone of the *nahda* movement in the beginning of the 1850's as books and periodicals began to include subjects that laid outside of governmental interest. Ami Ayalon notes that "private individuals [first]…entered the field in the 1850's…" when the prospect of printing became an appealing financial endeavor and provided "…satisfaction in contributing to the community's good through exposing the public to cultural and scientific treasures."[60] Western and Eastern literary works, histories, poems, and biographies were included and began to be translated and republished for private consumption. Historian Luis Shaykhu lists 1,516 works, 55 periodicals, and at least 22 separate presses operating in Lebanon before 1900 while Egyptian scholar Ayida Nusayr lists 9,538 works, 394 periodicals, and 105 separate printing shops in Egypt before 1900.[61]

The marked increase in the latter half of the nineteenth century reflected how periodical publications helped to solidify the position of the Beirut-Cairo nexus within the *nahda* matrix. The technology of print in the early twentieth century often emanated from these two centers into the periphery and was continually introduced by Syrian émigrés following the diaspora.[62] The state of the press in the Hijaz prior to the Arab Revolt had not begun in earnest until the constitutional revolution of 1908 when the province began to produce its own journals, *Shams*

Butrus al-Bustani, and Ya'qub Sarruf studied and printed such prominent journals as *al-Muqtataf*. The Syrian Protestant College was founded in 1866. ElShakry, *Reading Darwin in Arabic*.

[60] Ami Ayalon, "Private Publishing in the Nahda," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 40 (2008): 561-577. It is interesting to note how the appellations to public welfare (*maslaha* in the Islamic tradition) would be appropriated to a different purpose when the traditional authority of the '*ulama* and *a'yan* classes became threatened during the interwar period.

[61] Ayalon, "Private Publishing in the Nahda," pp. 562-563. Ayalon also notes in a footnote that the topics of these works being printed covered, "…history, literature, language, geography, agriculture, trade, crafts, and "general knowledge".' pp. 574.

[62] Some authors point to the rather lax censorship laws of Egypt and the financial opportunities as reasons for explaining the Syrian diaspora which occurred roughly from 1880-1914. Cioeta, "Ottoman Censorship in Lebanon and Syria," The Syrian networks existed throughout Europe, America, and the Middle East and were connected together through the medium of print. These networks were considered so crucial that *al-Qibla* devoted an entire article to the Syrian-Arab press in South America, see: N.A. "al-rūh al-'arabiyya: ṣaut ṣaḥafī 'arabī fi amrīkā," *al-Qibla*, Issue 95, (Ramadan, 23, 1335).

al-Haqiqa, *al-Islah al-Hijazī*, and *al-Madina al-Munawwara*.[63] Ami Ayalon wrote that, "Before the year [1908] was over no less than 44 new Arabic papers had appeared in Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, and Iraq, as well as in Istanbul…with [the Hijaz] producing a modest six."[64]

Prior to the constitutional revolution the province had no way to produce any print materials and either received journals from Syria and Istanbul through the postal service, or smuggled in banned periodicals clandestinely from Egypt.[65] These domestic journal disappeared prior to the war and printing remained dormant in the Hijaz until Sharif Hussein began subsidizing the newspaper *al-Qibla. Al-Qibla* released its first issue on Monday August 14, 1916 and at its height in 1919 could claim to produce as many as 5000 issues per week for subscribers.[66] *Al-Qibla* quickly developed into the mouthpiece of the Hashemite dynasty and a reliable source on the Arab Revolt with Muhibb al-Din establishing the state printing press, *al-matba'a al-'amriyya*.[67]

Researchers for the American-Arabian Oil Company (ARAMCO) compiled the entire collection of *al-Qibla* in the early thirties and wrote that, "The Gazette was published weekly in Mecca [issued on Monday and Thursday]… edited by Muhibb al-Din Khatib…" and ceased publication following the capture of Mecca by the *Ikhwan* in 1924.[68] Stylistically the paper conformed to many early examples of Arabic periodicals maintaining a uniform typeset,

[63] These journals were produced in Mecca, Jidda, and Medina respectively. Elias Hanna Elias. *La Presse Arabe.* (Paris: G.P. Maisonneuve & Larose, 1957), pp. 84.
[64] Ayalon. *The Press in the Arab Middle East*, pp. 65.
[65] Elias Hanna Elias list such prominent newspapers as *al-Ahram*, *al-Muqattam* and *al-Mu'ayyad* as being on the list of materials smuggled into the country. Elias, *La Presse Arabe*, pp. 83-84.
[66] Elias, *La Presse Arabe*, 85; Ami Ayalon also notes these figures in a footnote citing *al-Qibla*, 11, December 1919, pp. 2 as the source and writing that "according to the paper about 5,000 copies were distributed, only several hundred of them in the Hijaz." Ami Ayalon, *The Press in the Arab Middle East*, pp. 255.
[67] Lauziere. "The Construction of the Salafiyya," pp. 379.
[68] The printing press would still continue in the service of the Saud dynasty which produced both *Umm al-Qura* and *Sawt al-Hijaz* until World War II.

structure, and form which varied little over time.[69] The front page held the station-mast, date, and place of publication with a cover story that typically addressed some socio-political problems brought on by the war. The inside pages detailed developments pertaining to the war such as troop movements and news on the allied campaign against Germany alongside more pressing local concerns such as messages from the Sharif, the opening of schools, news from Ta'if, Jidda, and Medina, and the conditions of Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Egypt. The back page typically carried a synopsis of articles on world events gleaned from foreign news services like Reuters or foreign contacts in Brazil, America, and France.[70]

The introduction of the printing press in Yemen in contrast was carried out by Ottoman officials who transported the press to the province in 1877.[71] The press primarily printed government bulletins keeping Ottoman officials abreast about the political developments throughout the empire and rarely disseminated information to the public. Brinkley Messick wrote that "Manuscripts were still being made well into the present [twentieth] century, however."[72] These manuscripts kept periodical publications "…at a distance…" by emphasizing local pedagogical customs and showcase how the *nahdawīn* of Yemen drew upon different sources and favored different forums for addressing the project of modernity.[73]

Yemeni *nahdawīn* relied extensively on a corpus of manuscripts which were then transposed into books.[74] This in turn slowed down the development of both a nationalist society

[69] Each issue was typically between 6-8 pgs.
[70] These contacts are never named but the Syrian diaspora contained active elements in both Brazil and America who typically worked in the print industry, see: Stacy Fahrenthold, "Transnational modes and Media: The Syrian Press in the *Mahjar* and Emigrant Activism during World War I." *Mashriq & Mahjar*, Vol. 1, (2013): 30-54; Reem Bailony, "Transnationalism and the Syrian Migrant Public: The Case of the 1925 Syrian Revolt," *Mashriq & Mahjar*, Vol. 1, (2013): 8-29.
[71] Messick, *The Calligraphic State*, pp. 115.
[72] Messick, *The Calligraphic State,* pp. 117.
[73] Messick, *The Calligraphic State,* pp. 118.
[74] Messick, *The Calligraphic State*, pp. 15-36, pp. 115-131.

and the integration of the nation-state model because knowledge and historical writing was compartmentalized, fractured along sectarian and geographical divides, and dispersed throughout the many Mosques. The nation-state model did not reach fruition until Imam Yahya initiated a massive textual reform in 1925 designed to repair the place of knowledge within society by reforming the county's libraries and centralizing their sources.[75] Brinkley Messick wrote:

> "Simply stated, a genealogically modeled and status-sensitive circulation system has been largely replaced…by a free-market type designed for a democratically conceived citizenry. The older 'beneficial intent' rubric of the pious-book foundations has given way to the nation-state language…to help disseminate culture and knowledge to 'all people' (*li-kaffa afrad al-sha'b*)."[76]

The forum in which *nahdawīn* engaged modernity in Yemen remained detached from the periodical publications which characterized the Egyptian, Syrian, and *Hijazī nahdāt* and they relied instead on restructuring the physical and intellectual location of texts within their society. The *Hijazī nahda* in contrast utilized periodical publications and *al-Qibla* in particular, exclusively as the forum in which *nahdawīn* engaged the topic of modernity. This accelerated the acculturation process of the European nation-state model by facilitating the imagining process and imbuing the language of print with a certain degree of fixity. Before dissecting the intellectual processes in which *nahdawīn* framed their local discourses I would like to identify the *nahdawīn* themselves, focusing on the editors of *al-Qibla*, Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib and Fu'ad al-Khatib.

[75] This process began in 1925 both would not fully mature until the early 1940's. Messick, *The Calligraphic State*, pp. 115-122.
[76] Messick, *The Calligraphic State,* pp. 122.

Chapter Three

Muhibb al-Din and Fu‘ad al-Khatib as *Hijazī Nahdawīn*

Introduction

Chapter three will continue our discussion of print and textual variation by identifying the specific actors involved in the creation of the *Hijazī nahda* and how the mediums in which they published their discussions influenced the nature of knowledge within the local discourse. Muhibb al-Din and Fu‘ad al-Khatib like other *nahdawīn* of their generation are representative of a process replicated in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and other Arab provinces. The underlying question guiding this chapter will be determining why these two individuals as outsiders viewed the *Hijazī nahda* as something unique from the other *nahdāt*. To answer this questions we must first become familiar with the *nahdawīn* themselves.

The Editors of al-Qibla

Fu‘ad al-Khatib was born in 1897 in the village of Shehim outside Beirut and attended the Syrian Protestant College where he graduated in 1904.[77] Fu‘ad al-Khatib like many other intellectuals of his generation was active in literary and cultural clubs and was a member of the Syrian Scientific Society which according to Antonius “came into being in 1857…[when]

[77] Khayr al-Dīn al-Ziriklī. *Al-a‘lam: qāmus tarājim li-ash‘har al-rijāl wa-al-nisā’ min al-‘arab wa-al-musta‘ribīn wa-al-mustashriqīn*. Vol. 5. (Al-tab‘ah al-thālithah. Bayrūt: 1969). pp. 160. All biographical information related to Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib and Fu‘ad al-Khatib unless otherwise noted was taken from this source. The critical role of the Syrian Protestant College in the introduction of Western science has been dealt with in other works but it should be noted that the college was experiencing an academic shift following the “Lewis/Darwin Affair” and the dismissal of prominent faculty (Cornelius Van Dyke, Edwin Lewis, and William Van Dyke) and the suspension of several medical students (Jurji Zaydan being the most prominent). The curriculum at the time of Fu‘ad’s stay was transitioning into a more liberalized set of studies. For general information on this topic see: Brian Van Demark, *American Sheikhs: Two Families, Four Generations, and the story of America’s influence in the Middle East,* (New York: Prometheus Books, 2012), pp. 55-67; Betty S. Anderson, *The American University of Beirut: Arab Nationalism and Liberal Education* (Austin: University of Texas Press. 2012) pp. 35-55; ElShakry, *Reading Darwin in Arabic*.

Moslems…join[ed] in the formation of a new society to unite all [religious]creeds in the service of learning."[78] This early exposure and involvement with socio-political societies shaped his activities in Egypt as well. Fu'ad worked as a grammarian and teacher in Jaffa at the Orthodox college before traveling to Khartoum in 1909 as an employee of the Sudanese-Egyptian government and part-time informant for the British.[79] He was stationed in Cairo and in 1912 founded the Ottoman Party of Decentralization with fellow Syrians Rashid Rida and Rafiq al-'Azm.[80]

The Ottoman Party of Decentralization consisted of Syrian émigrés who joined together to push for decentralization within the Ottoman Empire and mobilize Arab opinion to support a stronger Arab presence in the local governments.[81] The party established branches in Syria, Iraq, Egypt, and Istanbul and by 1913 had emerged as a highly structured political organization. In January of 1913, Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib was appointed secretary for the party and became an active agent in promoting decentralization.[82] In March the party secretly met in Cairo and decided to work towards establishing an independent principality in Syria that was free from Ottoman control.[83] In April another secret society, *al-Fatat*, invited members of the party to participate in the Arab Congress in Paris and by August the C.U.P. had ratified the concessions awarded to the Arabs.[84] With the outbreak of World War I the Ottoman Party of Administrative

[78] This was in part due to the Christian massacre in Aleppo mentioned above. Antonius, *The Arab Awakening,* pp. 53.
[79] N.A. "Sherifial Ministry of Foreign Affairs." In *Arab Bulletin*: *Bulletin of the Arab Bureau in Cairo, 1916-1919*. Vol. II ed. Robin Leonard Bidwell, (1986): pp. 8.
[80] Antonius, *The Arab Awakening,* pp. 109-110. Sayyid Muhammad Rizvi, *Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib: A Picture of a Salafist-Arabist (1886-1969),* (PhD. Diss., Simon Fraser University, 1992): pp. 27-28.
[81] Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, pp. 109.
[82] It is likely that his work in the party introduced him to the Syrian Fu'ad al-Khatib who would play a larger role in *al-Qibla* and the administration of the Hijaz once the revolt was declared. Rizvi, "Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib: Portrait of an Arabist-Salafist."
[83] Eliezer Tauber, "Secrecy in early Arab Nationalist Organizations," *Middle Eastern Studies* Vol. 33 (1997): 119-127. pp. 122.
[84] Antonius, *The Arab Awakening,* pp. 114-116.

Decentralization collapsed as their platform became unobtainable and its members began joining other nationalist societies.

In the spring of 1916 Fu'ad al-Khatib left from Cairo, where he met with agents of the Arab Bureau, to accept a position with the Hashemite government of the Hijaz in the newly formed foreign affairs ministry.[85] While stationed in the Hijaz, he served as acting foreign minister (in Amir Abdullah's absence) and freelance editor for *al-Qibla*.[86] He fulfilled these duties through 1918 where he attended the Versailles conference with Faisal and was appointed secretary of foreign affairs for the *Faysali* government in 1919. Following the French invasion and the collapse of the *Faysali* government, Fu'ad was recalled to Mecca for government service by King Hussein only to be displaced after the latter's abdication in 1924. He remained in the service of King Abdullah of Transjordan for a number of years before accepting a position with the Saudi Government in 1940 as Ambassador to Afghanistan where he died in 1957.

Fu'ad al-Khatib throughout his life was deeply interested in the poetic traditions of Arabs and was even referred to in the Hijaz as "…the poet of the consultative council (*shura*)…"[87] He had already previously released his first collection of poems in 1910 before immigrating to the Hijaz and while in Afghanistan established a poetry section in the Saudi embassy to encourage Arabic poetry. The writings of Fu'ad al-Khatib stylistically and thematically reflect his interest in poetry containing the rhymed prose of the Arabic poetic tradition and discussing such topics as the position of "Arabic and the Arabs."[88] Fu'ad wrote that, "Certainly Arabic is the most eloquent of the Semitic languages and has the widest application and use in the world and do not

[85] N.A., "Sherifal Ministry of Foreign Affairs," pp. 8.
[86] N.A., "Sherifal Ministry of Foreign Affairs," pp. 8.
[87] Al-Ziriklī. *al-a'lam*, pp. 160
[88] Fu'ad Al-Khatib, "al-'arabiyya wā al-'arab," *al-Qibla*, Issue 14, (dhu al-hija, 1, 1334).

take for granted its rhythmic qualities or make light of its beauty and grace…"[89] While Fu'ad al-Khatib received a firm grounding in the functions of bureaucracy and civil service his experience was markedly different from the training of Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib.

Muhibb al-Din was born in Damascus in 1887 where he received a traditional religious education before attending the *maktab anbar* secondary school.[90] The curriculum at the school, "…included religious subjects, social sciences, physical sciences, languages, including Arabic, Turkish, Persian, and French, and composition of government correspondence."[91] Muhibb al-Din's mother died while he was young and his father Abu al-Fath Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Qadir b. Salih al-Khatib passed away while he was attending the school.[92] The death of his parents initiated what was to become a profound relationship with Sheik Tahir al-Jaza'iri, a renowned Islamic scholar whose father 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jaza'iri had led the Algerian resistance movement against the French in 1832.[93] Albert Hourani, in describing the influence of Sheikh Tahir al-Jaza'iri, related his role in compiling the Islamic manuscripts of pre-war Damascus in one central location in the *al-Zahriyya* library where Muhibb al-Din's father worked a curator.[94]

Tahir al-Jaza'iri also held debates and discussions at his home in Damascus every week, inviting local reformist '*ulama* and people of his generation (the greater circle) opportunities to debate with the newer generation of reformers (the lesser circle) of which Muhibb al-Din and the

[89] Al-Khatib, *al-Qibla*, Issue 14, (dhu al-hija, 1, 1334).
[90] Rizvi, "*Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib: A Picture of a Salafist-Arabist (1886-1969).*"
[91] David Commins, "Religious Reformers and Arabists in Damascus, 1885-1914,"*International Journal of Middle East Studies,* Vol. 18 (1986): 405-425, pp. 411.
[92] Rizvi writes that Muhibb's father was a religious teacher and was appointed curator (1879-1897) of the al-Zahiriyya library by the Islamic Benevolent Society whose founding member was his close friend Sheikh Tahir al-Jaza'iri. Rizvi, "*Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib: A Picture of a Salafist-Arabist (1886-1969).*"
[93] Kurzman, *Modernist Islam,* pp. 133. 'Abd al-Qadir immigrated to Damascus after the French invasion and became a leading member of Islamic modernism with a particular focus on the developing Salafism. This obviously influenced his son who in turn influenced his pupil and adoptee Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib.
[94]Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age,* pp. 222.

nahdawī Muhammad Kurd Ali were members.[95] These meetings had profound effects on how Muhibb al-Din conceptualized the ideological currents circulating throughout the empire. Escovitz wrote that, "Just as al-Jaza'iri has been described as someone who regarded the past as the stairway to solving the problems of the present…." Muhibb al-Din also regarded the historical past as something that could directly influence the future.[96] Tahir al-Jaza'iri directed Muhibb al-Din to explore the *Zahriyya* library which held the works of the noted *Hanbalī* jurist Ibn Taymiyya and introduced him to a particular notion of Salafism which espoused certain principles of Islamic modernism.[97]

Muhibb al-Din upon graduation moved to the imperial center of Istanbul, founded the *jam'iyyat al-nahda al-'arabiyya* society with Arif al-Shihabi, and took up a position as translator with the British consulate in Yemen.[98] He returned to Damascus in 1907 and then following his mentor Tahir al-Jaza'iri immigrated to Egypt where he worked for a brief while with Ali Yussef in the newspaper *al-Mu'ayyad* before establishing the *Salafiyya* bookstore in 1909.[99] During the early years of the war Muhibb al-Din traveled from Cairo to Basra (allegedly to mobilize secret nationalist societies) where he was detained by the British for seven months and then released under somewhat suspicious circumstances. Muhibb al-Din made his way back to Cairo before taking up a position in the Hijaz as the chief editor of *al-Qibla* where he would remain until the liberation of Syria in 1918.[100] The capture of Damascus and the defeat of the Ottoman Army by

[95] Joseph H. Escovitz, "He was the Muhammad Abduh of Syria: a Study of Tahir al-Jaza'iri and his Influence." *International Journal Middle East Studies,* Vol. 18 (1986): 293-310.
[96] Escovitz, "He was the Muhammad Abduh of Syria," pp. 303.
[97] Lauziere, "The Construction of the Salafiyya," pp. 376.
[98] Commins and al-Ziriklī also mention the Damascus branch of the organization which was started by Dr. Salah al-Din al-Qasimi (the younger brother of Jamal al-Din al-Qasimi who was later hanged by Jamal Pasha) and Lutfi al-Haffar. Commins, "Religious Reformers and Arabists in Damascus," pp. 411; Al-Ziriklī. *al-a'lam*, pp. 272.
[99] Lauziere, "The Construction of Salafiyya," pp. 377.
[100] Lauziere, "The Construction of the Salafiyya," pp. 379.

Arab and allied troops afforded Muhibb al-Din the opportunity to return to his native Damascus where he ran the capitol newspaper *al-Asima* until the French invasion.[101]

Following the collapse of the *Faysali* government and the French invasion of Syria, Muhibb al-Din migrated back to Egypt where he continued his work in the press and the *Salafiyya* bookstore.[102] Muhibb al-Din founded the *al-Zahra'* journal in 1924 and *al-Fatha* which sought to compete with the popular cultural/pseudo-scientific journals of *al-Hilal* and *al-Muqtataf* while continuing to advocate for the rights of Arabs.[103] Later in life after the disappointment and collapse of the Hashemite government he would go own to support King Ibn Saud and the Saudi state whom he shared a common Salafist creed. Muhibb al-Din would continue plying his trade editing the *al-Azhar* magazine throughout his life until he passed away at the age of seventy-two in 1969.[104]

Muhibb al-Din and Fu'ad al-Khatib like other *nahdawīn* of their generation comprised a highly mobile educated group of intellectuals who actively engaged in the medium of print throughout their lives. The equation of knowledge and travel is not inherently foreign to the Islamic tradition and was a practice that many Islamic theologians, philosophers, and historians like Ibn Khaldun participated in but the modern modes of transportation (primarily the steamship and railroad) in the nineteenth century accelerated and encouraged this process to a degree that had not been possible before.[105] By the time of the war in 1914, the *nahda* had acquired a

[101] James L. Gelvin, *Divided Loyalties: Nationalism and Mass Politics in Syria at the Close of Empire*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).
[102] Lauziere, "The Construction of the Salafiyya," pp. 382-383.
[103] Rizvi, "Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib: Portrait of an Arabist-Salafist."; Amal N. Ghazal, "The Other Frontiers of Arab Nationalism: Ibadis, Berbers, and the Arabist-Salafi press in the Interwar period." *International Journal of Middle East Studies,* Vol. 42 (2010): 105-122. He also founded the Muslim Youth Association, see: Al-Ziriklī. *al-a'lam*, pp. 272.
[104] Rizvi, "Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib: Portrait of an Arabist-Salafist."
[105] Gelvin and Green, *Global Muslims*.

permanent status in Egypt and Yemen under colonial rule and continued unabated in Iraq, Syria, and the Levant. Why, with the new ability of transportation, did Muhibb al-Din and Fu'ad al-Khatib decide that the *Hijazī nahda* possessed something that was absent in the other *nahdāt*?

The Exceptionalism of the Hijazī nahda

The answer itself lies in the political context of the *Hijazī nahda* for the Arab revolt was the only direct rebellion against the Ottoman authorities to acquire foreign services, assistance, and resources.[106] The revolt of the Sharif was susceptible to claims of opportunism from the beginning which confronted Sharif Hussein with two independent but interrelated problems. First, Sharif Hussein would have to legitimate the Arab revolt and explain why assisting the revolt was a duty incumbent upon all members of society. How could an Islamic religio-political authority appointed by the Caliph justify a rebellion against the sole Muslim empire who was in turn fighting the Christian colonial powers?[107] *Al-Qibla* first republished a two-part editorial entitled "The Arab Renaissance" that was originally contained in the Egyptian newspaper *al-Ahram*. The editorial laid out the Sharif's argument against the Committee of Union and Progress and bridged the gap between the present and the future.[108]

The editors drew a distinction between the C.U.P. and the past Ottoman Empire by claiming that, "…the Ottomans did not say other nations or ethnicities were forbidden from participating in the government and enjoying its benefits…" but, "…for the Unionists, no

[106] For a detailed analysis of how this process functioned within colonial circles and on the ground in Arabia, see: Priya Satia, *Spies in Arabia: The Great War and the Cultural Foundations of Britain's Covert Empire in the Middle East,* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).
[107] It's interesting to note that the Ottoman Empire was at least partially susceptible to the same claim having allied with Christian Germany but their distinction lies in the fact that they were fighting against the French and British who were predominantly Christian and not against other Muslims.
[108] N.A. *al-Qibla*, Issue 1, (Shawwal 15, 1334); N.A. *al-Qibla*, Issue 2, (Shawwal 17, 1334).

Ottoman state was just…"[109] This argument provided Sharif Hussein with enough space to claim that he was not explicitly rebelling against the power of the Caliph but instead fighting to uphold the sanctity of the Ottoman state and depose the Unionist who were "…ignorant of the ancient Arab nation (*umma*).[110] The second problem facing the legitimacy of the Arab revolt was to determine how to address the relationship that existed between Sharif Hussein and the colonial powers (primarily Britain and France). Sharif Hussein had established contact with the British colonial officials in Egypt as early as 1914 when Abdullah acting on behalf of his father met with Lord Kitchener in Cairo.[111] The British and the French seeing the usefulness of the revolt for their own war efforts (and post-war designs) immediately set about sanctioning the rebellion.

The relationship between Sharif Hussein and the colonial empires does not appear to influence the way Fu'ad al-Khatib and Muhibb al-Din perceived the *Hijazī nahda*. Fu'ad al-Khatib had already been employed as an agent of the British in Khartoum and Muhibb al-Din worked as a translator in the British Aden embassy. It is widely believed that his release from Basra was in large part influenced by his willingness to spy for the British.[112] The point is that these individuals harbored no qualms about working with the colonial powers if it did not interfere with the larger goals of the *Hijazī nahda*. Muhibb al-Din wrote later in life that:

> "The intellectuals of the Arab *nahda* in their campaign to promote education and culture within their community took Arab nationalism as a symbol to claim more rights and duties within the Ottoman state. These intellectuals were surprised with the outbreak of

[109] N.A. *al-Qibla*, Issue 2, (Shawwal 17, 1334).
[110] N.A. *al-Qibla*, Issue 2 (Shawwal 17, 1334).
[111] Mary C. Wilson, "The Hashemites, the Arab Revolt, and Arab Nationalism," *The Origins of Arab Nationalism,* ed. Rashid Khalidi et al. (New York: Colombia University Press, 1991): 204-224, pp. 211-212; Antonius, *The Arab Awakening,* pp. 127.
[112] Rizvi, "Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib: Portrait of an Arabist-Salafist."

> the war and saw their chances for inclusion into the Ottoman state disappear with the entrance of Turkey into the war on the side of Germany. Following the aggression of Jamal Pasha in Syria they turned to the *Hijāziyya* movement (*al-ḥarakat al-Hijāziyya*) which represented independence for the Arabs."[113]

The perception that the *Hijazī nahda* represented the move for independence of the Arabs appears to be the prime motivator for why both Muhibb al-Din and Fu'ad al-Khatib immigrated to the Hijaz and offered their services to the Arab revolt. The Egyptian *nahda* which they were familiar with from their time in Cairo was very much an Egyptian as opposed to an Arab endeavor and it is easy to forget that these are Syrians, who remained outsiders to Egyptian, Yemeni, or *Hijazī* society. The Yemeni *nahda* likewise would be hard for foreign *nahdawīn* to penetrate for it was predicated on genealogical linkage, sectarian identity (primarily *zaidism*), and other traditional modes of authority like the Imamate or legal theology. The Syrian *nahda* during this time as the quote alludes to was also violently repressed because "…the Unionist, who were mistrustful of all political movements (Arab, Circassian, Kurdish, etc.), suppressed the nationalist movement with force and terror."[114] In the *Hijazī nahda* on the other hand,

> "…the citizens used all their strength to create a new nation. Their objective was not to establish separate nationalities nor was it for their dignity in the eyes of their allies. The men who answered the call were satisfied with King Hussein because he was generous and sought the opinions of the other Arab princes- Imam Ibn Saud (Najd), Imam Yahya

[113] Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib. "Al-Hussein b. Ali: ka-mā ra'ātuhu fi ṯalāṯa sanawāt, kaifa i'atlā wa li-mā-ḏā fašal?" *Al-Zahrā`,* Vol. 1 (1924): 190-200. pp. 193-194.
[114] Al-Khatib, "al-Hussein b. Ali," pp. 194-195.

> (Yemen), and Sa'id Idrissi (Asir)-and worked to establish a relationship of mutual exchange between each one of them."[115]

The universalism for which the *Hijazī nahda* came to represent and which was lacking or relegated in the other *nahdāt* is replicated in the editorials of *al-Qibla* and appears as the catalyst for the immigration of Muhib al-Din and Fu'ad al-Khatib to the Hijaz. The uniqueness of the *Hijazī nahda* as we will see in the next chapter was continually framed in historical terms in conjunction with a futuristic focus. The use of historical writing was itself not unique, for Egyptian, Yemeni, and to a lesser extent Syrian *nahdawīn* relied upon the discipline in their own local discourses. What separates the *Hijazī nahda* is its orientation towards the future and the way in which history influenced the local contours of its discourse.

[115] Al-Khatib, "al-Hussein b. Ali," pp. 195-196.

Chapter Four

Historical Writing, Homogenous Empty-Time, and the Nation-State Model

Introduction

This chapter addresses the symbolic historical style of writing that existed in the editorials of *al-Qibla* and how the primacy of history effected notions of legitimacy, statehood, citizenship, legality and patriotism. Specifically we will examine the ability of history to subvert "homogenous empty-time" and introduce a very distinct institution, the nation-state, into Arab-Islamic conceptions of governance. The chapter will conclude by analyzing the terminological variance in the editorials of *al-Qibla,* examining how notions of country and community developed within the *Hijazī nahda*. To assist with the broader historical narrative of the Arab *nahda* in general, I will periodically point out key distinctions between the Egyptian, Yemen, and Syrian *nahdāt*.

Historicizing the Hijazī Nahda and the Nation-State Model

History occupied the central position of the *Hijazī nahda* as it became the favored medium for exhibiting oneself as modern. To speak of progress, rights, or legitimacy was to create an exposé on history and the discursive functions it utilized. The primacy of history in the editorials of *al-Qibla* meant that as the Arabs redefined their position within the world they also redefined the notion of time. Historical writing in *al-Qibla* conceptualized the *Hijazī nahda* as a movement whose objectives lay in the future. The objectives of the *Hijazī nahda* were to establish an independent Arab state that was free from colonial and Ottoman control in which the Arabs would possess equal standing with the European powers in the international order. This

meant that modern institutional forms like the nation-state would have to be introduced and legitimated within Arab-Islamic conceptions of governance.

The alignment of the *Hijazī nahda's* objectives "…in defense of their country, rights, history, and religion…" favored the nation-state model as a source of emulation because to be modern was to present oneself as a proponent of progression.[116] History as a discipline introduced to the readership of *al-Qibla* a historical narrative in which societal problems in the present (The world war, colonialism, etc.) contained comparable historical equivalents which transposed subjective understandings of what it meant to be modern.

Muhibb al-Din first introduced the nation-state model to the readership of *al-Qibla* by providing a historical narrative in which the colonial powers (the French and the British) were taken as the source of emulation.[117] Muhibb al-Din wrote that, "The English and the French represented the "greatest states of the past two centuries…who went through great pains to sustain the Arab nation and remove all dangers that may threaten its existence." These states assisted the Ottoman Empire when it was on the brink of collapse and encouraged "…administrative reforms by promoting progress, providing justice for citizens, and [restoring] security [and order]."

Muhibb al-Din goes on by writing that, "…[it is] advantageous to continue our investigation of this subject and its importance in the modern history of the Arab-Islamic country (*bilad*) [because] the states (*daula* pl. *duwal*) (Arab/Western) have been connected together by an exchange of mutual benefits, services, and collective rights upon which a moral and financial

[116] Fu'ad al-Khatib, "al-rūh al-'arabiyya al-jadīda," *al-Qibla*, Issue 33, (Safar, 11, 1335).
[117] Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib, "haula musādaqa al-duwal 'alā īstiqlāl al-dawla al-'arabiyya al-hāshmiyya," *al-Qibla*, Issue 38, (Safar, 29, 1335).

relationship can be established." There is a slight reorientation through historical narration in which the colonial empires of the French and British become legitimate forms of governance. Muhibb al-Din transitions into this argument by reminding his readership how the allies "…consider the establishment of an Islamic state (*al-daula al-islāmīyya*) as being advantageous to their interest and decreed by God almighty." The Europeans after all promote many of the underlying tropes of the *Hijazī nahda* like progress, reform, justice, and order and share a historically established moral basis. This reorientation also established the *Turanian*/Unionist paradigm as the antagonist of legitimacy.

The term *Turanian* was developed by European linguists as a catch-all category for dialectical variation amongst the Turkic tribes of Central Asia.[118] Muhibb al-Din and other editors in *al-Qibla* increasingly pointed out this cultural distinction which separated the Arabs from the Unionists and the Ottomans by utilizing the concept *Turanian*. Several of the articles for example address the topic of the *Turanian* and how it differs from the Arabs ethnically, morally, and historically.[119] Muhibb al-Din employed this term for a political, rather than linguistic, purpose interchanging the term *Turanian* with Unionist and thereby distinguishing the historical development of the Arab nation from the current C.U.P. administration. Muhibb al-Din wrote that, "The *Turanians* venerated the names of the Mongols and elevated their biographies which is a summation of the *Turanian* spirit…and there is no need to revisit the histories of the Mongols who the Unionist took as their role models [to emulate]."[120]

[118] Ilkher Ayturk, "Turkish Linguist against the West: The Origins of Linguistic nationalism in Attaturks Turkey." *Middle Eastern Studies,* Vol. 40 (2004): 1-25.
[119] Of the first sixty issues of *al-Qibla*, ten articles deal directly with the Unionist or *Turanians*. See Appendix B
[120] Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib, "al-rūh al-turānīya: haqā'iq tā'rīk̲iyya wa ījtimā'īyya yajb ānna y'arafahā kull 'arabī wa kull Muslim," *al-Qibla,* Issue 49, (rabi'a al-thāni, 7, 1335).

The framing of the *Turainian*/Unionist paradigm through historical writing established a hierarchy of institutions with varying degrees of legitimacy. The *Turanian* notions of governance resides at the lowest level of legitimacy (equated with the *Jāhilīya* of pre-Islamic times) because they were oppressive, neglected Islam, and more importantly damaged the natural inclination of Arabs towards patriotism. The Ottoman Empire resides at the next level of legitimacy because it could lay claim to some shared characteristics of the *Hijazī nahda*. The Ottoman Empire was a legitimate state based upon its Islamic legacy and Caliphal position but as we will see below, was no longer a viable institution because it was on the brink of collapse and did not have the capacity to promote progress, justice, and security. The Europeans states (France and England in this example) are reflective of the highest form of legitimacy because they have the power to promote progress, justice, and security, contain the material and financial resources needed to enact those principles, and respect the position of Islam.

Muhibb al-Din wrote that, "The *Turanians* returned to their deception…announced their call to arms…[and] disgraced the religious literature (the Qur'an and Hadith) which understands the meaning of life for those willing to understand [God]." What is needed is, "…faith [that] increases the conditions needed to subdue injustice and conquer heretics and corruptors installed by the [Unionist] reformers." God alone is the only figure who can stop the spread of the *Turanian* spirit and, "…the Arabs place their trust in God to annihilate his enemies…" Muhibb al-Din concludes that the *Turanians* have displaced the *shari'a*, damaged the standing of the Qur'an, and neglected Islam. Islam and the return of faith which, "God has deposited in every person…" is what's needed if, "the Arabs are to defeat the Unionist with their tongues, pens, and swords…" Muhibb al-Din then asked four rhetorical questions:

Did the *Turanians* not worsen [the state] by losing half of the Ottoman Empire? Did they not corrupt the doctrines of unity upon which the Ottoman state was founded upon? Did they not adopt the "*Jāhilīya*" as their message and disregard Islamic culture? Did they not oppress the people with violence and murder and damage their inclination towards patriotism (*qaumītina*)? The feelings of helplessness only increased in the citizens of the Ottoman Empire when the Unionist came into power "…and increased oppression, aggression, devastation, and tyranny." Muhibb al-Din wrote that the Arabs consider an official endorsement of the Arab state (*al-daula al-'arabiyya*) and "…a refutation of the *Turanian* state (*al-daula al-turanianin*) and its claim to the Ottoman past…" as a mark of legitimation.

History has written the nation-state into the historical narrative of the future Arab state by elevating the positions of the French and British Empires and emphasizing their shared historical and moral basis with the Arabs. Historicizing their argument allowed the editors of *al-Qibla* to establish the *Turanian*/Unionist paradigm as the "other" category in contrast to the Arabs and antitheists of progression and the *Hijazī nahda*. This is a direct observation which merits no further elaboration for one can readily see from the evidence how the process functioned and established a hierarchy of legitimation. There is present however, a more subtle point which illuminates how history functioned as a discourse, as opposed to a discipline, and reconfigured notions of time and space.

Time and Space in the editorials of al-Qibla

Muhibb al-Din in establishing a hierarchy of legitimation between unquantifiable objects (The Unionist regime, the Ottoman Empire, The French and British, and the undefined Arab state) has forced his reader to conceptualize history as a chronological process in which present day examples also possessed historical equivalents. The Mongolian Khanate is transported into

the present through time and space and the reader is forced to transform the *Turanian*/Unionist into an *imagined* Mongolian Khan.[121] Ruptures in time were subjective factors because those ruptures represented distinct historical eras which were quantifiable and comparative.[122] This allowed Muhibb al-Din to distinguish the Unionist era from the Ottoman era and include the Mongolian Khanate without contradicting the historical narrative. The development of this process represented an entirely new conception of the function of history as time became something that could be categorized, generalized, labeled and quantified.[123] Yoav Di-Capua wrote that, "By the end of the nineteenth century, history began to be written from the point of view of the future, in which the 'the keyword is Progress, History is understood as a process, and Time itself as moving to an end (progression)[in the future].'[124]

The past was not the only perception of time subjected to reconfiguration for the present could also be transposed into the future. Yoav Di-Capua wrote that:

> "…history is seen and judged from the future vantage point of its eventual success. Thus, the present is no longer an extension, an expansion, or simply a repetition of the past. Rather, it is the future's point of beginning…"[125]

The objectives of the *Hijazī nahda* and its characterization as a second voice which stood in contradistinction to the intellectualism of the late nineteenth century *nahda* meant that the *Hijazī nahda* was conceptualized as the only movement in the present that claimed to have some

[121] Emphasis is added on imagined because it represents a completely modern perception of the place of time and its connection to the readership. Furthermore, it is an internal organic process in which everyday reality is envisioned as having or requiring there to be a historic counterpart.
[122] Reinhart Koselleck. "Concepts of Historical Time and Social History." In *The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts*, trans. Todd Samuel Presner et al., (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002): pp. 115-130.
[123] Di-Capua, *Gatekeepers of the Arab Past,* pp. 3-5.
[124] Di-Capua, *Gatekeepers of the Arab Past,* pp. 46.
[125] Di-Capua, *Gatekeepers of the Arab*, pp. 61.

bearing on the future. Muhibb al-din wrote that, "There is an excellent opportunity in the Hijaz for establishing an Arab state in particular and an Islamic state in general…" The *Hijazī nahda* then was a movement that was determined to be "…an example for other oriental countries and [the international community]…" which is predicated on its ability to exist within the future.[126] "The Arabs have become pillars of power…" after all "…and rose up to establish this state [the Arab state] and to prove to the world that the Arabs are people of divine grace and power."

The opportunity appears in the editorial as a fleeting moment which must be seized upon by Arabs in the present day in order to establish a future objective. Muhibb al-Din established a sense of urgency in the minds of his readership by pointing out that the *Hijazī nahda* is the only present option available for establishing a future nation-state. Historical writing has imbued the perception of present time with a degree of selectivity that makes imagining the future indispensable to the objectives of the *Hijazī nahda*. The argument is extremely persuasive in mythologizing the *Hijazī nahda* within the readership of *al-Qibla* while simultaneously altering perceptions of time and space. I am not arguing that the reconfiguration of "homogenous empty-time" was unique to the *Hijazī nahda.* Examples of the reconfiguration of time and space as Anderson argued can be seen in all forms of print production and historiographical writing. Instead I am showing that the editorials of *al-Qibla* and the *Hijazī nahda* specifically, remained the first arena in which this process underwrote the nation-state model within the Islamic world.

In Egypt for example the relationship between Arab society and the colonial officials were often met with violent repression which hardened instead of softened local resolve towards the colonial powers. Egyptian *nahdawīn* had at their discretion a glorious historical tradition

[126] Al-Khatib, *Al-Qibla*, Issue 38, (Safar, 29, 1335).

embodied in the modernization efforts of Mehmet Ali (the Founder Paradigm/Thesis) that sought to modernize the country and was initiated without colonial assistance.[127] Egyptian *nahdawīn* utilized "homogenous empty-time" to glance back into the past upon the historical era of Mehmet Ali and see the institutional framework of an Egyptian state, one that predated colonialism and could be reclaimed if the British were overthrown. The Egyptian *nahdawīn* could then exclude or relegate questions of legitimacy, statehood, and authority that the *Hijazī nahda* had to directly address or formulate because these concerns had already been articulated by previous Egyptian *nahdawīn*.

The colonial experience was non-existent in the Hijaz which freed *Hijazi nahdawīn* from the inhibitions that plagued the Egyptian and Yemen *nahdāt* and allowed them to construct their own historical narrative. The Ottoman bureaucratic structure was an institution that did not possess the naturalness of its Egyptian counterpart and could not be reclaimed by the *Hijazī nahdawīn*. The *Hijazī nahdawīn* instead relied upon "homogenous empty-time" as we see above to claim a space for themselves in the future order. This futuristic focus predisposed the *Hijazī nahdawīn* to center upon the European nation-state model. The lack of interaction with colonial regimes until the revolt in the Hijaz also assisted the process by blinding the proponents of the *Hijazi nahda* to the violent policies of colonial officials in Egypt, India, and North Africa. This is not to say that the editors of *al-Qibla* or *Hijazī* society at large were unaware of colonial brutality but to argue that they were able to dispense with those policies more quickly than their Egyptian, Indian, or Maghrebi counterparts, in favor of establishing an equal partnership with the European powers mediated through the nation-state model. The amenability of the nation-state model and

[127] Di-Capua, Yoav, *Gatekeepers of the Arab Past,* pp. 1-18.

its centrality to the *Hijazī nahda* had important consequences as we will see for other *nahdāt* after the war.

The modularity of the Hijazī nahda

The openness which characterized the *Hijazī nahda* was comprised out of a naivety regarding direct colonial policy, the socio-political circumstances induced by the war, and a futuristic orientation which favored the nation-state model. This openness allowed the discourse of the *Hijazī nahda* to transition into other *nahdāt*, primarily in Syria. The Syrian *nahdawīn* did not begin to address the project of modernity openly until after the liberation of Damascus and the establishment of the *Faysali* government. Keith Watenpaugh has shown extensively how the Aleppo newspaper *Halab* served as a medium for engaging the project of modernity following the British occupation in November 1918.[128] Watenpaugh agrees with Timothy Mitchell that the project of history in the Syrian *nahda* was "nation as pedagogy" where:

> "…the national community is understood as the history of a self that comes to awareness, or a people that begins to imagine peoplehood. History is written to describe the growing self-awareness of imagination of a collective subject. The imagination takes the form of a gradual revealing of the collective subject to itself, a revelation shaped by those powers of communication, reason, and consciousness that define our understanding of an emergent self."[129]

Watenpaugh is concerned with locating the nationalist roots of Aleppine society in the middle class and wrote that periodicals:

[128] Keith David Watenpaugh, *Being Modern in the Middle East: Revolution, Nationalism, Colonialism, and the Arab Middle Class*, (New Jersey: Princeton, 2006).
[129] Watenpaugh, *Being Modern in the Middle East,* pp. 136-137.

> "…operated as one element of a broader project for diffusing a specific vernacular of nationalism…[where]…they would make appropriate substitutions, tie in linguistic and cultural preconditions, narrate a history, impose a meaning on the salient points of that narrative, and deny or obliterate divergent interpretations, alternative renderings of the past, and local knowledges."[130]

In Watenpaugh's quest for the location of nationalism in middle class Aleppine society he disavows the project of the *nahda* in favor of a nationalist reading which does not fully explain how local Syrian communities transitioned in the interwar period. Simply put, Watenpaugh's historical narrative views the interwar period in Syria as a seamless transition from occupied Ottoman province into a fractured but nationalist nation-state imposed by the colonial empires. This is inadequate for explaining how the tropes of modernity developed within Syria and does not acknowledge the modularity of the *Hijazī nahda* in the larger international order.

The *Hijazī nahda* had already developed a symbolic system of discourse different from the Egyptian and Yemeni *nahdāt* that centered on historical writing and the reconfiguration of time and space. Muhibb al-Din being the chief editor of *al-Qibla* developed this system in the Hijaz and then upon the liberation of Syria at the hands of the Arab army transported it to the province with his work in the capital paper *al-'Asima*. Muhibb al-Din wrote in Damascus that:

> "Syrian Public opinion combines that which is constant and that which is novel because it borrows from past tradition and is faithful to eternal goals. It links that which is novel with tradition according to the dictates of the time, attempting thereby to balance new exigencies and ancient tradition; it is satisfied with the new as long as it does not

[130] Watenpaugh, *Being Modern in the Middle East,* pp. 137.

> contradict the old, or it will resist it unto death if the two remain in contradiction. This is the secret of the Syrian's optimism toward new things…it is also the reason for his pessimism in regard to all he wishes to safeguard."[131]

This dichotic relationship between the past, present, and future as we have seen was first worked out in the editorials of *al-Qibla* utilizing historical writing. Watenpaugh in summarizing the tropes addressed in *Halab* wrote that "By centering sovereignty on questions of ethnicity, 'race,' or language, the paper decentered the role of religion, by adopting the laicist definition of the Arab, the paper equated modernity with non-sectarianism."[132] What Watenpaugh fails to recognize is that the Syrian *nahdawīn* were drawing upon the *nahda* literature in general and the familiar tropes of the *Hijazī nahda* in particular which was transported to Syria with the Arab army and Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib. The nationalists renderings of Syrian history relegates the position of the *Hijazī nahda* as a movement imposed by the colonial powers but we can clearly see from the evidence above how it functioned as a model for introducing the nation-state to other Arab provinces.

Nothing appeared more progressive during World War I than the European powers and the nation-state model which Muhibb al-Din then wrote into the historical narrative of the *Hijazī nahda*. This in turn solidified the discursive contours of history within the Hijaz by equating its methodology with an examination and classification of the past which held some hidden but factual basis with the current socio-political environment. Historical writing in turn altered how the readership of *al-Qibla* viewed the function of time by reconfiguring space and interlocking disparate elements of *Hijazī* society together as a unified entity. To further understand how

[131] Gelvin. *Divide Loyalties*, pp. 185.
[132] Watenpaugh. *Being Modern in the Middle East*, pp. 158.

history encouraged certain aspects of modernity over others we need to examine the role of terminology and the specific tropes that it singled out as being representations of the modern. Specifically, I want to examine which types of language history favored and how those terms came to shape the *Hijazī nahda*.

The Historicity of Umma and the relationship of Community

Muhibb al-Din wrote an article entitled "How we serve our country" that defined in idealistic terms the character of the Arab revolt and the role of society in the developing Hashemite state.[133] The Arabs had "awakened to the sound of this blessed renaissance" and the, "…world [became] attentive to us (the Arabs) [and] created praise on what is now occurring in our country (*bilad*) in the numerous great works and the short period of time in which they were completed." The Arabs and the Hashemite state had finally overcame "…the administrative chaos which was notorious in the preceding government (C.U.P.)" and set about developing the framework for instilling loyalty to the country (*bilad*).

The government in the article is responsible for the collective good of the community (*umma*) by maintaining security and order and promoting and protecting individual rights (*huqūq al-afrād*). Muhibb al-Din writes that, "…the community is obligated to develop its wealth and to [use and develop] its intellectual and physical capabilities [bestowed by God] and not to remain idle." Each sector of society, the merchants, manufacturers, scientists, and preachers perform specified tasks to reach predetermined objectives for the benefit of society as a whole. The merchants for example, "…serve [their] country by being pious administrators…that are

[133] Al-Khatib, *Al-Qibla*, Issue 53, (rabi'a al-thāni, 22, 1335).

trustworthy, eager, and serious…" which create conditions favorable for a good year which everyone can enjoy.

Muhibb al-Din goes on to outline the role of each member within society stating that the preachers provide, "strong spiritual guidance for their nations and communities…scientists serve their country by selecting the easiest path for disseminating useful knowledge(*al-'ulum al-nafa'a*)…" and "manufactures serve their country by recording the advantages that they have learned…" Scientists play an especially important role because "the works undertaken by knowledge facilitates the learning of Arabic, Arabic literature, and the establishment of Arabic [as the only medium] for religious and secular knowledge (*al-'ulum al-dinīya*)…" The article concludes by stating that "service to the country is viewed individually and collectively by all movements and members [of society] in their actions and speech."

History has established the idea of progression as a trope of modernity by bifurcating the government (*hukūma*) from the community (*umma/* pl. *umam*) and treating each entity as separate but equal components of the country. This introduces distinct characteristics of progression like loyalty to the country (patriotism), government responsibility, and the belief in basic rights which all stem from exertion and work. The relationship between the community and the country (*bilad*) is one of interdependence in which the latter's ability to perform its responsibilities is dictated by the community's desire to increase their physical and intellectual faculties. If either group neglects their responsibilities or fails to establish a mutual bond with societal well-being at its center, the project results in maladministration and an underdeveloped nation. There is a "social contract" for lack of a better phrase between the *umma* and the country

that is the result of a historical relationship.[134] Muhibb al-Din solidified this relationship and embellished its historical lineage by introducing the term *umma* into the editorial which carried both a different meaning and source of legitimacy.

The term *umma* is derived from both the Qur'an and Sunna and traditionally carries the meaning of community, particularly the Islamic community. The term *umma* was employed early in conceptions of Islamic governance after the Prophet Muhammad immigrated to Medina and established the first Islamic state. The Constitution of Medina was created which defined both Muslims and Jews as comprising separate *umam*.[135] Islamic jurists and legalist in the pre-modern period utilized the term to establish a political system in which the Caliph remained the leader of the Islamic state and representative of the Islamic community (*umma*). The usage and conception of the term remained unchanged until the period of the *nahda* when scholars in the Islamic world began to confront the developing political climate as European empires encroached upon the traditional divide of *dar al-Islam* and *dar al-Harb*. Manzooruddin Ahmed writes that, "The exponents of Arab nationalism gradually transformed the idea of Islamic *umma* into an Arab *umma*."[136]

The editorials in *al-Qibla* reflect this developing trend with *umma* sometimes referring to an Islamic community and in other editorials referring to an Arab/Islamic nation. In another editorial entitled "Hashemite Authority" Muhibb al-Din employed the term as a synonym of nation writing that, "Amir Abdullah has laid down in front of his country (*ummathu*) a framework drawn from the experiences of [other] countries (*al-umam*)."[137] The article then

[134] Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract*. Trans. G.D.H. Cole. (New York: Barnes & Noble Inc. 2005).
[135] "The Constitution of Medina," from W. Watt, Muhammad at Medina (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956): pp. 221.
[136] Manzooruddin Ahmed, "Umma: The Idea of a Universal Community." *Islamic Studies,* Vol. 14 (1975): 27-54. pp. 49.
[137] Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib. "haula al-kalimat al-hāshmiyya." *Al*-Qibla, Issue 28, (Haram, 24, 1335).

detaches the term *umma* from its traditional meaning by saying that "the last century was characterized by freedom, intellectualism, and prosperity with other peoples which garnered Abdul al-Hamid support within the Islamic community (*jama'at al-Ikha'a al-Islamī*)." The term *jama'at* has replaced *umma* in the parlance of community and *umma* has been transformed to include a conception of nation that is inherently modern.

Jama'at did not replace *umma* because the latter term had lost its ability to communicate the principle of community. *Umma* simply served the historical narrative better by instilling within the readership a familiarity which traversed across time and space, making the nation-state part of the Arab/Islamic past. The historicizing of language and the utilization of "homogenous empty-time" was a historical process that influenced the polemics of argumentation in the Arab press just as it developed the language that was being employed. The *umma* was recognizable during the *Rashidun*, *Umayyad*, and *Abbasid* eras just as it was recognizable now in the age of the nation-state. The terminological choice far from being unspecific was deliberate in that it transported the historical symbolism of *umma* into the modern notion of nation by reconfiguring the space between the ancient ancestors and the modern citizens.

Muhibb al-Din also employed the term *watan* which is typically translated in the modern day as something equated with homeland or country. Muhibb al-Din for instance writes that, "…we feel entrusted with universal rights in this country (*watan*) because we are the citizens of whom the country is formed and the country's benefits are dependent upon us."[138] These universal rights remain undistinguished and undefined because it both facilitates the imagining

[138] Al-Khatib, *Al-Qibla*, Issue 53, (rabi'a al-thāni, 22, 1335).

process and introduces a distinctly modern notion of belonging (patriotism). The readership is given the freedom of determining both the characteristics of the "universal rights" and the parameters of the *watan* which might remain local in nature or expand in scope to encompass a larger territorial entity.

The term *bilad* also appears in the title of the article "How we serve our Country (*bilad*)" and most frequently in the responsibilities of the merchants, scientists, preachers, and manufactures. The connection of the term with acts of service (*khidmī al-bilad*) alludes to the fact that it represents for Muhibb al-Din a separate conception of the term country and its relationship to the citizenry. The service that these citizens provide are built upon the collective action of society working for the improvement of the state. Muhibb al-Din wrote that:

> "The preacher in the mosque like the doctor in the hospital first heals the psychological disease and then treats the physical disease [because] the foundation of medicine is the proficiency in diagnosing the disease and [having] the knowledge to stop it…"

The treatment of society lies in the ability of its members to equate actions and services to the state as being a historical "social contract" between the individual and the country (*bilad*). In service to that contract Muhibb al-Din includes a prophetic hadith which states that, "Every one of you is like a shepherd and every one of you is responsible for what is under his custody…the father, teacher, and housewife are all shepherds."[139]

History interacted with the *Hijazī nahda* on the conceptual level by developing a "social contract" between the *umma* and the *bilad* that reconfigured how the readership of *al-Qibla* perceived their role in society. The trope of progression mandated that the citizens have

[139] For an analysis of this hadith and its relationship to citizenship, see: Mohammad Hashim Kamali, *Citizenship and Accountability of Government: An Islamic Perspective,* (Cambridge: The Islamic Texts Society, 2011): pp. 170.

responsibilities to the state just as the state had responsibilities to its citizenry. William Cleveland has analyzed the early issues of *al-Qibla* and concluded that, "the political vocabulary of the contributors to *al-Qibla* reflected a terminology in transition, a blurring of nationalist and religious concepts, and a reliance in the end on an Islamic ideology."[140]

Cleveland is right in acknowledging the reliance of Muhibb al-Din and Fu'ad al-Khatib on an Islamic ideology, reflected in their usage of Islamic terminology. The morphology of *umma* is a good indication of this process showcasing how history as a discipline and discourse organically reinterpreted the past as comparable to the present while revealing key aspects for the future. The terminological choices did not reflect haphazard approaches to the project of modernity or the fluctuation of political terminology in a moment of transition but instead represent a deliberate mechanism for historicizing language.

Though history remained at the center of the *Hijazī nahda* and exerted greater influence over the development of its local discourses, it was not the only operational base for constructing an argument. The next chapter will direct our attention to the role of religion by examining its employment in the editorials of *al-Qibla.* What becomes clear when analyzing the nature of religion in *al-Qibla* is just how encompassing history as a discipline became. Religion and Islam is entirely subservient to history which speaks to the discursive power it wields as it sought to define modernity.

[140] Cleveland, "The Role of Islam as Political Ideology," pp. 92.

Chapter Five

The Position of Religion in the *Hijazī Nahda* and the Nature of Authority

Introduction

The entrenchment of religion was not as imbedded in the socio-political discourse of *al-Qibla* as heavily as one may think. Often-times religion functioned in a secondary role to historiographical writing in which religion supported the historical narrative. This chapter begins with a synopsis of Muhibb al-Din's writings on the nature of the *umma* and legitimacy before comparing the experiences of *Hijazī* and Yemeni *nahdawīn*. The case study will revisit our previous discussion on collective action to show how each *nahda* conceptualized the role of religion within society and how that influenced the nature of legitimacy and the place of Islamic law (*shari'a*). The chapter will conclude by providing examples that display the process by which religion became subsumed under the larger discipline of history and what that entailed for the perception of authority in the *Hijazī nahda*.

A Case Study in Collective action

The *Hijazī nahda* and Muhibb al-Din in particular placed primacy on the position of the *umma* as one of two actors charged with promoting and establishing the parameters of the nation-state. Muhibb al-Din's belief in the *umma* remained a continual staple of his writings throughout his life. He wrote in *al-'Asima* in October 1919 for example that:

> "Rather, the great mass of the nation is composed of working people, those who dwell in villages and mountains, those who are devoted to breaking the soil and planting it. It

> is to these that the educated [*muta'allimin*] must devote their zeal, enlighten their hearts and advance their talents and intellectual abilities."[141]

In 1924 Muhibb al-Din again in describing the characteristics of Arab nationalism also wrote that:

> "Arab nationalism- like all nationalisms on the face of the planet- desires to inspire its citizens and establish a period of security…but the *umma* implemented Arab nationalism in their lives-for who can be worthier than the Arabs- who renewed society in the revival of Islamic civilization and the entire Islamic world."[142]

The power of implementation lay with the *umma* for Muhibb al-Din and in the editorials of *al-Qibla* it increasingly got translated into collective action by establishing the prerequisites for "serving the country."

The Yemeni *nahda* in contrast to the *Hijazī nahda* was an intellectual process steeped in the religious tradition of *zaidī* Islam. Both groups of *nahdawīn* employed historical writing but in the Hijaz it was utilized as a tool to reconfigure notions of time and space, write the nation-state model into the historical narrative of the *Hijazī nahda*, and re-alter perceptions of legitimacy. The Yemeni *nahdawīn* in comparison "remained generalists of the 'old school.' All were trained in a core of knowledge centering on *shari'a* jurisprudence, which provided the common intellectual foundation for historical as for other branches of scholarship."[143] This meant that Yemeni *nahdawīn* framed their local discourse legalistically and religion served as the center of the Yemen *nahda* and history as its subset, a complete formulaic reversal from the *Hijazī nahda*.

[141] Gelvin. *Divide Loyalties*, pp. 202.
[142] Al-Khatib, "al-Hussein b. Ali," pp. 193.
[143] Messick, *The Calligraphic State*, pp. 131.

This also meant that historical writing was utilized in Yemen to shore up traditional modes of authority like the Imamate (*imama*).

In Yemen where the *nahda* was religiously focused and legalistic in nature it was "…contained in the principle of 'collective duty' (*fard kifaya*) [and] elaborated by early jurists. According to this doctrine, the Muslim community [*umma*] as a whole is kept on a legitimate and observing basis so long as a sufficient number of individuals perform the necessary collective duties imposed on the community by God. Some of these duties including knowledge of the law [*shari'a*]."[144] While defining collective action along the same parameters, the Yemeni *nahdawīn* elevated the religious and legal aspects of their movement and "Despite strong egalitarian counter-currents the *shari'a* understanding of the social order was anchored in the distinction between knowledge and ignorance…"[145] This is a strong distinction from the *Hijazī nahda* where collective action was framed by *nahdawīn* as a "social contract" between the governing elites and the people in which everybody is imbued with the ability to understand and entrusted with the responsibility of rationality.

The Yemeni *nahdawīn* instead established a hierarchy that was continually supported by the religious texts (*shari'a*) that distinguished who legally held the rights to the responsibilities of collective action. Brinkley Messick shows for example how witnessing which is "a predominant egalitarian formula [in Islamic law which states]…that all Muslims are by definition persons whose legal testimony is admissible (*al-muslimun 'udul*), is subject [in Yemen] to qualifications that open preoccupations of a hierarchical society."[146] Messick goes on to list how occupational differences, social standings, sectarian affiliations, religious minority

[144] Messick, *The Calligraphic State*, pp. 154.
[145] Messick, *The Calligraphic State,* pp. 166.
[146] Messick, *The Calligraphic State,* pp. 161.

status, and interpersonal relationships all influence the structure of the hierarchical system in collective action.[147] In the *Hijazī nahda* the editorials in *al-Qibla* specifically exclude these legal discussions favoring a universalism in which the preachers, scientists, and merchants all occupy the same legal categories.

The position of the *shari'a* in the future Hashemite state was important in so far as it provided a check upon the authorities. Muhibb al-Din writing retrospectively of the Hashemite state, wrote that:

> "King Hussein was a devout Muslim who would get angry if he saw a decree that was prejudice towards the *shari'a*. Unfortunately, he thought of himself as intellectually quicker that the minds of most men and the wisdom and knowledge of the *shari'a*. I know of some examples for instance where he disavowed the commentators of *tafsir* and interpreted the verses in accordance with Arab nationalism but contrary to their linguistic meaning…if this was true he should have consulted the text of the *shari'a* instead of inferring the verses of the Qur'an."[148]

King Hussein also "…claimed that his country (*bilad*) did not use the laws nor the *shari'a* and what a pity it is that we did not recognize it. And indeed the laws are derived from the spirit of justice, which is mostly contained in the law, and it does not mean that the *shari'a* did not work…"[149] The spirit of justice alludes to the *sharia's* ability to mediate between society and the ruler and imbue the *umma* with the power of determination. The religiosity of the *shari'a* as a divine system of guidance was consequential or peripheral to the goals of the *Hijazī nahda*

[147] Messick, *The Calligraphic State,* pp. 159-166.
[148] Al-Khatib, "al-Hussein b. Ali," pp. 199-200.
[149] Al-Khatib, "al-Hussein b. Ali," pp. 199-200.

because the prevailing focus was upon the state-building project. This is why the "…laws [as] derived from spirit of justice…" stand out in comparison to the Yemen *nahda*.

The *shari'a* in the Hijaz was universal, adaptable and amenable to the developing political environment because it already possessed the "spirit" of the modern age, ensuring rights (justice) and collective action while empowering the *umma*. The *shari'a* in Yemen was also universal, adaptable, and amenable to the modern political environment but it empowered traditional modes of authority, specifically the *imama*, and not the citizenry. This distinction reflects in one way how the *Hijazī nahdawīn* thought about the position of law as being something essential but not central to the state-building project and by extension peripheral to the goals of the *Hijazī nahda*.

The reason for this is that *Hijazī nahdawīn* emphasized historical writing as a mechanism for reconfiguring the position of the *umma* by imbuing those members with the belief that they constituted and were entrusted with the same universal rights. The Yemeni *nahdawīn* in contradistinction employed historical writing as a means of elevating the position of religion and by extension the *shari'a* which reoriented the focus of the Yemen *nahda* upon a different source of legitimation (*Imamic* authorities). Religious legitimacy was more pronounced in Yemen and its effects as we see distinguished its character from its regional neighbor by emphasizing the traditional over the modern. The *Hijazī nahda* was predicated on the belief that progression lay within the discipline of history and *nahdawīn* like Muhibb al-Din and Fu'ad al-Khatib ensured through their writings that it remained entrenched in the minds of their readership. I want to continue our exploration of the role of religion in the *Hijazī nahda* by analyzing the nature of authority and its shift within the Hijaz.

Religion in Service to History

The Hijaz was a multi-ethnic religiously homogenous area that contained the two holiest cities in Islam (Mecca and Medina). The Sharif was himself a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad from the *Banu Hashim* and his political position up until the revolt was entirely dependent on his religious responsibilities as the guardian of the holy mosques. We have already seen how history shaped notions of legitimacy macrocosmically by reorienting the focus of *al-Qibla's* readership on the future and then writing the nation-state into the narrative of the *Hijazī nahda*. As the institutional focus of legitimacy shifted, so too did the nature of authority and the position of Sharif Hussein. This was performed on a religious base for the nature of politics and Islam had remained intertwined since the time of the Prophet Muhammad. Fu'ad al-Khatib wrote for instance that, "The *Hijazī nahda* which is supported by the people of this sacred place [was created] to assist the religion of Islam and the [strengthen] the true path…reverberating in the hearts of every believer and Muslim."[150]

Religion as stated above held the same powers of history in that it could also reconfigure space as a mechanism for rectifying the past, present, and future. Fu'ad al-Khatib wrote, "Onward sons of Islam. Raise high your swords. On to death which is eternal! You are fighting for the cause of the fatherland…for the cause of all Muslims everywhere."[151] Just as Muslims fought against the Mongols and the Byzantines, the Arabs in the present day are fighting against the *Turanians* for the cause of Islam because "the remaining nations are striving to limit their strength and restrict their authority and prestige by fragmenting their power and eradicating their iniquities, may God have mercy on humanity and protect it so as to not completely destroy

[150] al-Khatib, *al-Qibla*, Issue 2, (Shawwal 18, 1334).
[151] Cleveland, "The Role of Islam as Political Ideology," pp. 92; Cleveland cites: al-Khatib, Fu'ad. *Al-Qibla* Issue 3, 1334, 22, Shawwal.

itself."[152] At the head of this effort stood "Hussein b. Ali, a descendant of the Arabs and king of the Arab nation…" who "God has singled out…"[153]

The description of Sharif Hussein above is completely detached from his religious functions as the guardian of the two holiest mosques and replaced with his ethnic lineage as king of the Arab nation, a political position, for which God had singled out. This is not to say that religion had no place in the future (for it certainly did) but instead to point out a different facet of the relationship between the disciplines of history and religion as they relate to the *Hijazī nahda*. History had one purpose that went beyond its disciplinary function just as religion could transfer itself out of the spiritual realm and transform itself into a vehicle for discussing modernity. King Hussein as opposed to Sharif Hussein represents this point well as Muhibb al-Din accentuated his political as opposed to religious function. This is a process that was meant to transition Sharif Hussein into King Hussein by emulating modern political positions.

The Yemeni *nahdawīn* in comparison did not seek to detach Imam Yahya from his religious position nor did they reconfigure the position of *qadis*, *muftis*, and scribes within society in relation to the state.[154] Drawing upon the scholastic tradition of zaidī Islam, Imam Yahya remained at the center of religious life for Yemeni *nahdawīn* and the political functions which his position included were of a secondary nature to his role as religious leader of the community. In Oman where "…the *Ibadī nahda* shifted from a movement of literary renaissance and religious renewal to a political movement seeking solidarity with other Muslims…" the nature of authority remained with the *imama*.[155] The only Arab leader to have underwent a

[152] Al-Khatib, *al*-Qibla, Issue 49, (rabiʿa al-thāni 7, 1335).
[153] Al-Khatib, *al*-Qibla, Issue 28, (Haram, 24, 1335); Al-Khatib, *al*-Qibla, Issue 38, (Safar, 29, 1335).
[154] Messick, *The Calligraphic State*, pp. 152-166.
[155] Ghazal, *Islamic Reform and Arab Nationalism*, pp. 20.

similar change to that of Sharif Hussein was Ibn Saud whose religious position as the leader of Wahhabism in Najd slowly evolved into a monarchic position as founder of the Saudi state. This only occurred after the complete consolidation of the Arabian Peninsula, a bloody civil war against the *Ikhwan*, and the elimination or co-optation of competing sources of authority within the Hijaz, Yemen, and Asir.

Islam as a religion also underwent a process of revision in the editorials of *al-Qibla* as it was gradually characterized as "…a group of social virtues and methods of learning…"[156] Muhibb al-Din wrote that, "…Muhammad brought this religion which called for morality and awakened the Arabs by requiring them to attempt to obtain moral perfection for themselves and mankind." Religion had acquired a non-normative feature that allowed it to be devoid of its spiritual connotations by emphasizing its universal characteristics and its role as a moral system. Muhibb al-Din wrote in the same article that:

> "I faced towards Mecca that night in meditation of almighty God and the meetings of the holy prophet Muhammad. I read Quranic verses and the hadith that represented the conditions during the life of the Prophet Muhammad and became familiar with the historical facts. I then began to imagine the lives of the men that created the Arab nation with the divine guidance of Islam…"

Religion is subservient to the historical narrative and the process by which Muhibb al-Din was able to imagine the past Arab nation while simultaneously forcing his readership to imagine the future Arab nation.

[156] Al-Khatib, *al*-Qibla, Issue 52, (rabi'a al-thāni, 19, 1335).

Religion as a discipline was incorporated into the objectives of the *Hijazī nahda* through the symbolic historiographical writings of the editors of *al-Qibla*. This in turn influenced how they conceptualized the nature of religious law, authority, and legitimacy by repositioning the place of religion within the state. The Yemeni and Omani *nahdawīn* placed religion at the center of their revival projects and it in turn legitimated traditional modes of authority positing that the primacy of religion held within itself the ability to dictate historiographical traditions and future modes of legitimacy. The *Hijazī nahdawīn* were less likely to rely entirely upon religion as the determinant of the future and so they elevated the position of historical writing and reformed the positions of legitimacy and authority by introducing subtle honorific changes that mimicked religious affiliations. The framing of the *shari'a* as something that inherently carried the meanings or "spirit" of Western law and the changing titles of Hussein b. Ali are microcosmic examples of this process in action. What this chapter has tried to show is that history and religion were increasingly brought into contact within the *Hijazī nahda* as a means of defining progression which was increasingly measured by the similarities between European and Arab notions of authority.

Religion was of central importance to this project in so far as it marked a difference between European and Arab governments. The Oman and Yemen *nahdāt* developed out of a push to interject Islamic identity into the debate in the face of colonial expansion and emphasize the differences between Europeans and Arabs. Religion was addressed in the *Hijazī nahda* not because its position was perceived to be threatened as it was in Yemen and Oman but because it remained a point in need of clarification in order for the *Hijazī nahda* to claim, as it did, that it was the proponent of progression. The *Hijazī nahdawīn* unlike their Yemen, Egyptian, and Omani counterparts interjected religion into the discourse of the *Hijazī nahda* to exemplify the

similarities between European and Arab perceptions of authority. Religion was defined and addressed historically as a vehicle for transitioning into the modern and the characterization of the *Hijazī nahda* as the proponent of progression ensured that its articulations in *al-Qibla* drew similarities and not distinctions to Western notions of statehood, legitimacy, and authority.

Chapter Six

The *Hijazī Nahda* in Conceptual Historiography

Conclusion

The *Hijazī nahda* remained at the center of an intellectual process that began in the late nineteenth century with the formation of the Beirut-Cairo nexus and continued into the peripheral regions of the Maghreb, Arabia, and Iraq until the end of colonialism and World War II. Nationalist renderings of history shorten this process chronologically and view the interwar period as the beginning of nationalism and the nation-state model. What the *Hijazī nahda* shows is that the process of creating a national identity, if one believes it occurred in the interwar period, could not have established any credibility without the local discursive contours of the *nahda* model. These supposed ardent nationalists are really *nahdawīn* who through their work in the Arab press or Ottoman and colonial bureaucracies established the language, methodology, and discourses for developing nationalist thought.

Muhibb al-Din and Fu'ad al-Khatib are representations of the mobility of Arab intellectuals in the pre/post-war climate as *nahdawīn* pursued similar educational and political activities, often within the same geographical locations or claimed membership within the same societies. These actors shaped the local contours of their discursive traditions by utilizing periodical publications in conjunction with a new methodology for defining the modern. Historical writing and its essentialness to the project of modernity meant that *nahdāt* had to incorporate the discipline of history as a means for defining their position within the international order.

The Egyptian *nahda* employed history in a manner that sought to elevate the place of the monarchy and "placed Egypt as the subject of a historical scheme of transition from medieval backwardness, through renaissance and an anti-colonial struggle, to liberation and modernization." Yoav Di-Capua goes on to write that, "In that way, it formed the organizational principles of the discipline and established the standards for how to arrange, regulate, and systematize the invention, dissemination, and consumption of historical knowledge." Egypt while employing history in the same way as the *Hijazī nahda* took as its focus a monarchial power which is transportable, highly selective, and always subject to challenges arising from competing historical narratives.

The Yemeni *nahdawīn* utilized history as well but its orientation was directed upon inward sources of legitimacy, often around the position of religion and the *shari'a*. While this process removed some of the volatile claims of legitimation by emphasizing the omnipotence of God, it in turn created another highly selective hierarchy which subjected to competing sectarian claims could release as much violence as its Egyptian counterpart. Brinkley Messick wrote that:

> "The appearance of stand-alone 'forms' and a new relation form and content were integral to the technologies of signification at the heart of the re-orderings. This transformation was not an evolutionary event but a historical one, part of the gradual incorporation of Yemen into the structures of the world system. In a world influenced in different ways by the imperial and colonial West, highland Yemen represents a situation at one extreme of the continuum of possibilities, in which change occurred at a pace marked by an unusual absence of outside intervention."

The close of the World War and the enactment of the Sykes-Picot agreement witnessed the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the disenchantment of Arab society, and the failed project of

a universal Arab state. The Hijaz and the interior of Arabia remained the only arena in which an Arab state existed that was independent of colonial control. The relationship between Ibn Saud, the ruler of the interior and King Hussein had historically been a complex relationship with both sides jockeying for position as the leader of Arabia. Problems arose as early as 1911 over the collection and payment of taxes and "Sharif Hussein with the power of the Ottoman State began to break the power of neighboring provinces, especially Sa'id Idrissi and Imam Ibn Saud…"[157] Muhibb al-Din, in writing retrospectively on the Sharifian-Saud relationship, wrote poetically that, "…the arrow had been issued from the bow…"[158] After the war Ibn Saud and his army (referred to as the *Ikhwan*) laid siege to the Hijaz and consolidated their hold on the region with the capture of Jidda in 1925.[159] King Hussein abdicated and the newly formed *Hijazī* state was incorporated into the developing Saudi state. The incorporation of the Hijaz witnessed another transformation in historical writing and the beginnings of the Saudi *nahda* which continued throughout the interwar period.[160]

The *Hijazī nahda* stands apart from its regional neighbors in the way it employed history, as both a discipline and a discourse, and in its orientation towards the future which allowed it to quickly adopt the nation-state model as a source of emulation. Historical writing was at the heart of the project of modernity and the Hijaz benefited from not having experienced the often brutal process of colonization (unlike Yemen, Egypt, and eventually Syria). Historical writing was a dialectic tool for addressing what it meant to be modern and the *Hijazī nahda* elevated such tropes as progress, rights, patriotism, independence, and statehood as comprising the core

[157] Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib. "Al-Hussein b. Ali," pp. 191.
[158] Al-Khatib, "Al-Hussein b. Ali," pp. 199.
[159] W.F. Smalley, "The Wahhabis and Ibn Sa'ud," *Muslim World*, Vol. 22 (1932): 227-246.
[160] Jörg Matthias Dettermann, *Historiography in Saudi Arabia: Globalization, and the State in the Middle East*, (New York: I.B. Tauris & Co., 2014).

essence of modernity. We have seen how Muhibb al-Din in particular employed this symbolic system of discourse as a means of unification and how it compared with the Yemeni, Syrian, and Egyptian *nadhawīn* efforts.

The exceptionalism of historical writing in the *Hijazī nahda* laid in its ability to mediate the complexities of the present socio-political environment through "homogenous empty-time." The editors of *al-Qibla* translated for a readership what it meant to be modern in the past, present, and future by claiming and exhibiting that the whole of history was comparable and transportable. The belief that present or future conditions contained historical equivalents that are applicable instilled within the developing Arab state an initiative that located their position within the international order at the center of Arab progress. This is why after the failure of the Arab revolt and the crumbling of the Hashemite state Muhibb al-Din would locate the blame, not on the position of history or the failure of the *umma*, but on "…King Hussein b. Ali [who] did not attempt to understand the foreign affairs and its effects on the Hijaz from studying its sources but instead chose to rely on his own intelligence and the imagination of his mind…" Embedded within that quote and the message it conveys is the teleology of historical writing in the *Hijazī nahda*.

Appendix A

Hijazī Nahda

1. N.A. “haula al-nahda al-‘arabiyya fi‘l-hijāz.” *al-Qibla*, Issue 1, (Shawwal, 15, 1334).
2. N.A. ““haula al-nahda al-‘arabiyya fi‘l-hijāz (Part two).” *al-Qibla*, Issue 2, (Shawwal, 18, 1334).
3. al-Khatib, Fu‘ad, “mauqif al-‘arab ba‘da nahda al-hijāz,” *al-Qibla*, Issue 2, (Shawwal 18, 1334).
4. N.A. “al-nahda al-hijāziyya,” *al-Qibla*, Issue 3, (Shawwal, 22, 1334).
5. N.A. “ḵawāṭir mab‘ūṯ haula al-nahda al-hijāziyya,” *al-Qibla,* Issue 9, (dhu al-q‘ada, 14, 1334).
6. N.A. “ḵawāṭir mab‘ūṯ haula al-nahda al-hijāziyya,” *al-Qibla*, Issue 10, (dhu al-q‘ada, 17, 1334).

Arab Renaissance

1. N.A. “al-nahda al-‘arabiyya,” *al-Qibla*, Issue 1, (Shawwal, 15, 1334)
1. N.A. “al-nahda al-‘arabiyya: da‘wa al-āmīr halla hīya ‘unṣurīyya ām lā,” *al-Qibla*, Issue 2, (Shawwal 17, 1334).
2. N.A. “al-nahda al-‘arabiyya wa al-daffā‘‘anhā fi al-hind,” *al-Qibla*, Issue 22, (Muharram, 3, 1335).
3. N.A. “nahda al-‘arab: mubāya‘a jalāla sayyidnā al-mu‘azzam malakān ‘alīhum,” *al-Qibla*, Issue 22, (Muharram, 3, 1335).
4. N.A. “ṣadan al-nahda al-‘arabiyya fi sinḡāfūra,” *al-Qibla*, Issue 29, (Muharram, 27, 1335).
5. N.A. “al-nahda al-‘ilmīya,” *al-Qibla,* Issue 33*,* (Safar, 11, 1335).

6. N.A. “ṣadan al-nahda al-‘arabiyya fi afrīqiyā al-maḡribīya,” *al-Qibla,* Issue 33, (Safar, 11, 1335).
7. N.A. “al-nahda al-‘ilmīya,” *al-Qibla,* Issue 35, (Safar, 18, 1335).
8. N.A “al-nahda al-‘arabiyya,” *al-Qibla*, Issue 36, (Safar, 22, 1335).
9. N.A. “al-nahda al-‘arabiyya: mauqif faransā wa al-‘manīya tujāha al-‘ālam al-islāmīya,” *al-Qibla*, Issue 41, (rabi‘a al-āwwal, 9, 1335).
10. N.A. “’ulamā al-turk wa al-nahda al-‘arabiyya,” *al-Qibla*, Issue 54, (rabi‘a al-thāni 26, 1335).

History, Culture, Language, and Religion

1. N.A. “mustaqbal al-islām wa al-‘arab,” *al-Qibla*, Issue 3, (Shawwal, 3, 1334).
2. N.A. “īnti‘āš al-‘ālam al-islāmī,” *al-Qibla,* Issue 8, (dhu al-q‘ada, 10, 1334).
3. N.A. “muqāra‘a al-atrāk al-madanīya al-‘arab,” *al-Qibla*, Issue 11, (dhu al-q‘ada, 21, 1334).
4. N.A. “halla īqāẓiatanā al-‘abr,” *al-Qibla*, Issue 16, (dhu al-hijja, 8, 1334).
5. N.A. “al-rūh al-‘arabiyya,” *al-Qibla*, Issue 26, (Muharram, 17, 1335).
6. N.A. “al-‘arab wa al-turk,” *al-Qibla*, Issue 27, (Muharram, 20, 1335).
7. N.A. “ḵitāb ilā al-‘ālam al-islāmī.” *al-Qibla*, Issue 27, (Muharram, 20, 1335).
8. N.A. “‘ināya al-dawla al-‘arabiyya al-hāshmiyya,” *al-Qibla*, Issue 30, (Safar, 1, 1335).
9. N.A. “li-mā-ḏā ṯa’arat al-balad al-‘arabiyya,” *al-Qibla,* Issue 30, (Safar, 1, 1335).
10. N.A. “al-rūh al-‘arabiyya al-jadīda,” *al-Qibla,* Issue 33*,* (Safar, 11, 1335).
11. N.A. “al-āmn al-āmm fi al-hijāz,” *al-Qibla*, Issue 36, (Safar, 22, 1335).
12. N.A. “al-waḥda al-‘arabiyya wa ‘udwāha al-tūranīyun,” *al-Qibla*, Issue 37, (Safar, 25, 1335).

13. N.A. “jāmaʿat al-ādab al-luḡa al-ʿarabiyya,” *al-Qibla*, Issue 47, (rabiʿa al-thāni, 1, 1335).

Appendix B

Turanian

1. N.A. “ṣafḥa min tā’rīk̲ al-īttihādīn wa mā janūhu ‘alā al-dawla al-‘uṯmānīya,” *al-Qibla*, Issue 3, (Shawwal, 22, 1334).
2. N.A. “ṣafḥa min tā’rīk̲ al-īttihādīn wa mā janūhu ‘alā al-dawla al-‘uṯmānīya,” *al-Qibla,* Issue 4, (Shawwal, 25, 1334).
3. N.A. “ṣafḥa min tā’rīk̲ al-īttihādīn wa mā janūhu ‘alā al-dawla al-‘uṯmānīya,” *al-Qibla,* Issue 5, (Shawwal, 29, 1334).
4. N.A. “ṣafḥa min tā’rīk̲ al-īttihādīn wa mā janūhu ‘alā al-dawla al-‘uṯmānīya,” *al-Qibla,* Issue 6, (dhu al-q‘ada, 3, 1334).
5. N.A. “min al-tā’if ilā al-madīna al-munawwar,” *al-Qibla*, Issue 9, (dhu al-q‘ada, 14, 1334).
6. N.A. “al-‘arab fi naẓara al-īttihādīn,” *al-Qibla*, Issue 10 (dhu al-q‘ada, 17, 1334)
7. N.A. “ifsād al-īttihādīn li-niẓām al-‘ā’īla baina al-muslimin,” *al-Qibla*, Issue 20, (dhu al-hijja, 26, 1334).
8. N.A. “al-nahda al-‘arabiyya wa al-īttihādīn,” *al-Qibla*, Issue 23, (Muharram, 26, 1335).
9. N.A. “wa ṯanīya al-īttihādīn,” *al-Qibla*, Issue 29, (Muharram, 27, 1335)
10. N.A. “al-īttihādīn wa al-qimār riwāya šāhid ‘iyān,” *al-Qibla,* Issue 40, (Rabi‘a al-āwwal, 7, 1335).

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N.A. “i‘lān,” *al-Qibla,* Issue 11 (Dhu al-Q‘ada, 21, 1334).

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